Knowing the Good: Studies in Plato's Republic

博士論文

Knowing the Good: Studies in Plato's *Republic*

(〈善〉のイデアを知る――プラトン『国家』篇研究)

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Introduction

In this thesis, I provide an interpretation of Plato's epistemology in the *Republic*. In so doing, I will also consider several aspects of Plato's metaphysics, including the theory of the Form. The passages I will discuss are V, 476d7-480a13, VI, 505e1-2, the Simile of the Sun (in particular, VI, 509b7-9), and the Divided Line (VI, 509c1-511e5, VII, 533c8-535a2).

In Platonic studies, especially in the Anglosphere, there has been a tendency to assume that the "knowledge" (*epistēmē*) Plato discusses is nothing but knowing a certain set of propositions, and that this is also the case with the *Republic*. Gregory Vlastos,[1] in an oft-cited article where he discusses the theory of the Form, is committed to such a view. This is also the case for Gail Fine, Julia Annas, Richard Sorabji, and Cross and Woozley[2]; each of whom explicates Plato's epistemology in the *Republic* while maintaining this assumption. (Sorabji even contends that Aristotle and Plotinus also deem knowledge as knowing certain propositions.) More recently, Jyl Gentzler[3] vigorously promulgated a version of this "propositional knowledge" interpretation.

In this thesis I will challenge the stream of thought that characterizes Plato's conception of knowledge as knowing certain propositions. I will argue that knowledge for Plato consists of some intuition into the Form, and that we should take seriously the fact that Plato frequently compares knowledge to the vision of some object (a point vividly illustrated by Andrea Nightingale[4]). Most importantly, I will underline the "non-propositional" aspect of knowledge Plato has in mind. Moreover, I will attempt to show that, for Plato, cognitive states other than knowledge, such as belief (*doxa*) and thought (*dianoia*), are also "non-propositional" in the sense that they are irreducible to knowing or believing

[1] Vlastos (1965).
[2] Fine, chs. 3 and 4, originally published in 1978 and 1990; Annas (1981), chs. 8 and 11; Sorabji; Cross and Wooley, chs. 8 and 10.
[3] Gentzler.
[4] Nightingale, ch. 3.

any proposition.

Although, for Plato, I construe knowledge to be irreducible to knowing propositions, I will argue that the acquisition of knowledge comes about only in the midst of discursive thinking in which dialecticians communicate, exchange, or support certain propositions. In this way, I will argue that Plato deems it crucial for an individual to handle propositions to acquire knowledge. Furthermore, for Plato, those who possess knowledge of X are capable of making correct judgements about X. In this way, the possessor of knowledge, which in itself is not identical with any propositional knowledge, may well know relevant propositions.

Francisco Gonzalez and Cathrine Rowett[5] have previously made such points in a highly convincing manner. I owe a great deal to their studies. However, in this thesis, I will consider passages they do not fully discuss. Furthermore, because my interpretation of the Divided Line differs substantially from theirs, my overall picture of Plato's epistemology (and metaphysics) in the *Republic* will differ accordingly.

In the following chapters, I will consider each of the aforementioned passages to explicate Plato's epistemology in the *Republic*.

I will consider Plato's conception of knowledge and the procedure with which to bring it about in Chapters 1 and 5, respectively. I will discuss Socrates' argument towards the end of V in Chapter 1 and his description of the philosophical dialectic in the Divided Line, VI-VII in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2 focuses on Socrates' description of the Good at 505e1-2, immediately before the Simile of the Sun. I will demonstrate that this passage attributes a view to Plato according to which every soul pursues the Good at least at a deep level of the soul; this is also a characteristic manifestation of the conditions of the soul that are irreducible to comprehension of propositions.

In Chapter 3, I will discuss the Simile of the Sun by addressing what to make of two different ways of talking about the Form of the Good. My interpretation of the philosophical dialectic in the Divided Line, which is

[5] Gonzalez (1996), (1998a), esp. ch. 8, (1998b); Rowett, esp. parts 1 and 3.

illustrated in Chapter 5, rests on this discussion of the Form of the Good.

Chapter 4 concerns another aspect of the Divided Line, namely, the description of geometricians; I will argue that while their cognitive state is concerned with a certain intellectual object, this state is not to be exhausted by knowing any geometrical propositions.

It is also important to note that because Plato presents his ideas in the form of a dialogue, and thus never expresses what he really means to readers, any interpretation of Platonic dialogue, including my own, inevitably involves a level of speculation.

Despite the difficulties associated with the study of Plato, I believe that, at least with regard to some aspects of his corpus, there is still ample room for meaningful scholarly debate over the correct interpretation and this includes the *Republic*. The passages of the *Republic* I choose to discuss in this thesis exemplify this. Careful consideration of these passages will provide the key to illuminating Plato's epistemology.

To conduct a meaningful scholarly debate and present a specific interpretative claim about a certain passage, one may appeal to consistency with other places in the Platonic corpus. Alternatively, one may discuss the philosophical merits (or demerits) embedded in the philosophical view that is ascribed to Plato as a result of taking a specific line of interpretation. I will adopt both approaches, amongst others, when supporting my own interpretation or rejecting others.

By doing so, however, I do not mean to provide anything akin to a knockdown argument for each of the issues under discussion. Rather, I will simply attempt to render my interpretation as convincing as possible in the hope that it contributes to the elucidation of Plato's philosophical thoughts as presented in the *Republic* and, ultimately, to encourage further study of Plato.

Chapter 1
Knowledge and Belief in V, 476d7-480a13

1. Raising an Issue

In this chapter, I will consider *Republic* V, 476d7-480a13. Before raising an issue about this oft-discussed passage, let us first take a look at the broader context where this passage is placed.

In V, Socrates, with a view to showing the feasibility of the ideal city (Callipolis) he has pictured so far, talks of what would be the minimum change that is required to transform one of the existing cities into such an ideal city (471d8-473e3). Socrates maintains that it is the governance by philosophers, and that there will be no end to suffering for the human race without it (473c11-d6). Then, Glaucon says that such a claim would arouse very bad feeling among "a great many, not undistinguished people," and asks Socrates to justify his claim against it (473e5-474a4, 474b1-2). The series of arguments Socrates provides upon this request continues, substantially, until VI, 502a3.

This series of arguments is divided into two. In the first half, Socrates, while talking with Glaucon, first (A) defines what the philosophers are (V, 474b4-480a13, whose latter half is the passage under discussion here in this chapter). Next, Socrates (B), taking the nature of the philosophers into consideration, argues that it is the philosophers that should rule the city (VI, 484b4-487a8).

Adeimantus then points out that although he cannot object to Socrates' argument in word, philosophers are, as a matter of fact, seen to be useless or extremely odd people, and that the claim for their governance is to be rejected altogether; so he asks for further explanation (487b1-d8). The latter half of the series of the arguments, designed to justify philosophers' governance, starts by responding to this request, and proceeds as conversation with Adeimantus. (Related but distinct points beside justification for philosophers' rule are also

discussed.)

Responding to Adeimantus, Socrates points out, in order, that certainly the philosophers have the ability to rule the city, and that they appear useless because the existing cities do not try utilizing them (487e4-489d1); that in the present situation, those with a philosophical nature are prone to be corrupted and are likely to do the greatest evils if corrupted (490e1-495b6); that at present, those who are inappropriate for philosophy are touching it (495b8-496a10); and that only a few people who have evaded the corruption avoid dealing with politics to continue to philosophize (496a11-497a5). Then Socrates, in turn, argues that any of the existing constitutions is inappropriate for sound development of philosophy and that it is Callipolis which is suitable for philosophy (497a8-497d3); that it is not until young people get old enough that they are allowed to deal with philosophy (497e4-498c4); that although philosophers taking charge of a city seldom happens, it is not impossible (499b1-d7); and that the philosophers in charge of a city would embark on governance in an excellent way. By appealing to excellence of the rule to be obtained and to the goodness of philosophers' character, Socrates has Adeimantus agree that the multitude would be completely convinced that philosophers should govern the city (501c5-502a3).[6]

In the first half of the series of arguments designed to justify philosophers' governance, i.e., at the beginning of (A), Socrates first defines the philosophers as those who are willing to sample any and every kind of study (475b8-c8). Glaucon asks if, then, "sight-lovers" (*philotheamones*), the kind of people who rush around at Dionysia to listen to the performances, are counted as philosophers (475d1-e1). Socrates answers negatively, and draws a distinction between the philosophers and the sight-lovers in the following passage, 475e4-475d5. He says that the philosophers, who recognize that there are Forms and love to see them, have "knowledge" (*gnōmē*), while the sight-lovers, who are unable to do this, have mere "belief" (*doxa*). The philosophers are compared to

[6] Through this series of arguments, Socrates gradually persuades Adeimantus that the multitude would accept his claim. Cf. 499c7-499d9, 501c5-10, 501e1-5, 501e6-502a3.

those who are awake while the sight-lovers are compared to those who are dreaming.

Socrates, assuming that the sight-lovers are offended to hear that they have only belief and hence dispute against him and Glaucon, suggests persuading them calmly (*peithein ērema*) (476d7-e2). Socrates presents his argument for persuasion to Glaucon, who is speaking for the sight-lovers (476e4-480a13). This is the argument that I will focus on in the present chapter.

With regard to this argument, I would like to address the following question. What does Socrates mean by "knowledge" (*epistēmē*, *gnōsis*) and "what is" (*on*), on the one hand, and "belief" and "what is and is not" (*on te kai mē on*), on the other hand? I would like to address this question because consideration of this issue would provide a key to understanding Plato's epistemology (and metaphysics) in our dialogue. (Another reason is that my discussion of another issue, presented in the Appendix to this chapter, is based upon my answer to that question.)

In what follows in this chapter, I will first give a summary of Socrates' argument at issue (Section 2). I will present and support my own interpretation of it after rebutting several representative preceding ones (Section 3).

2. An Outline of the Argument

Socrates' argument in 476e3-480a13 goes as follows:

(1) "What completely is" (*to ... pantelōs on*) is completely knowable, and "what is not in any way" (*mē on ... mēdamē[i]*) is wholly unknowable. (477a2-5)
(2) Therefore, knowledge is concerned with (*epi*) "what is" (*on*), and ignorance with "what is not" (*mē on*). (477a10-11)
(3) If there is such a thing as to be and not to be (*on te kai mē on*), it lies between "what is" and "what is not"; and the cognitive state concerned with this kind

of thing[7] lies between knowledge and ignorance. (477a6-9, a11-b3)

(4) Capacities are distinguished by what they are concerned with (*eph' ō[i] ... esti*) and what they achieve (*ho apergazetai*). (477c1-d7. Cf. b8-10)

(5) Since knowledge and belief each achieve different things in the sense that knowledge is infallible (*anamartēton*), whereas belief is fallible (*mē anamartēton*), they are different capacities. So they have different objects (by (4)). So belief is not concerned with "what is" (by (2)) or, for that matter, with "what is not." (477c1-478c6. Cf. 477b4-7)

(6) Belief is darker than knowledge and brighter than ignorance, and so lies between them. (478c7-d12)

(7) Since the sensible such as many beautiful things and just things admit of opposite appearances (i.e., appear beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, etc.), they "are and are not" (most people's *nomima* (usually translated as, e.g., "conventions")[8] being tumbling around (*kylindeitai*) "what purely is" (*to on eilikrinōs*) and "what is not"). Therefore, belief is concerned with the sensible. (478e1-479d9)

(8) Those who are only concerned with the sensible only "believe" (*doxazein*), whereas those concerned with "things themselves" (*auta hekasta*), i.e. Forms,[9] know and do not believe; the latter are "philosophers" (*philosophoi*), the former "lovers of belief" (*philodoxoi*). (479d10-480a1)

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[7] The construction having changed, "*epi*" now governs the dative as a cognitive state. But the substantial meaning remains the same as before.

[8] See Subsection 3 in Section 3.

[9] Typical expressions that stand for Platonic Forms are:

(1-1) "*auto to* F" (to "F" come adjectives such as "*kalon*" and "*agahton*"); *Symposium*, 211d3, *Phaedo*, 65d4-5, e3, 74a12, c1, c4-5, d6, e7, 75b6, c11-d1, 78d1, 100b6-7, c4-5, d5, 102d6, 103b4, *Republic*, 490b2-3, 507b4, 532a7, b1, 597a2, c3, *Phaedrus*, 247d6-7, 250e2.

(1-2) "(*auto*) *ho estin* F*"*; *Symposium*, 211c8-9, *Phaedo*, 65d13-e1, 74b2, d6, 75b1-2, d2, 78d4, 92e1, *Republic*, 490b3, 507b6, 532a7, 597a2, 4-5, c3.

(2-1) "*idea*"; *Phaedo*, 104b9, 104d2, 6, e1, 105d13, *Republic*, 479a1, 486d10, 505a2, 507b5, 508e2, 517b8, 526e2, 534c1, 596b1, *Phaedrus*, 265d3, 273e2.

(2-2) "*eidos*"; *Phaedo*, 102b1, 103e3, 104c7, 106d6, *Republic*, 476a6, 510b8, 511c2, 596a6, 597a1, *Phaedrus*, 249b7, 265e1, 266e4.

(2-3) "*ousia*"; *Phaedo*, 65d13, 76d9, 78d1, 92d4, 101c3, *Republic*, 509b7, 523a3, 524e1, 525 b3, c6, 526e7, 534a3, b4, *Phaedrus*, 247c7.

3. What is "Knowledge"? What is "Belief"?

In this section, I discuss what argument Socrates means to present in 476d7-480a13, by paying special attention to the concepts of "knowledge" and "belief" here. (In the Appendix to this chapter, I will consider how the sight-lovers understand it.) First let us survey a couple of representative interpretations on this issue.

3.1. Fine's Interpretation

It is often said that the Greek "be" (*einai*) has at least three principal usages: you can use "*einai*" (and its participle "*on*") either existentially (i.e., as meaning "exist"), predicatively (i.e., as meaning "be F"), or veridically (i.e., as meaning "be true").[10]

Let us look into a pretty unique interpretation among many, Fine's. She basically[11] takes "be" in Socrates' argument at issue veridically, and understands "*on*" (for her, "what is true") as meaning a certain set of true propositions. On the other hand, she regards "*on te kai mē on*" as "what is and is not true," i.e., a certain set of true and false propositions.[12][13] According to this interpretation, "knowledge is concerned with "*on*" (477a10) means that the propositions that are the content of knowledge are always true. Likewise, "belief is concerned with "*on te kai mē on*" (477a11-b2) means that the propositions that are the content of

[10] For a comprehensive study of the usages of "*einai*," see Kahn (1973).
[11] Fine reads 478e7-479d1 predicatively. Fine, 70-71.
[12] For Fine, this does not mean that each proposition of this set is both true and half, i.e., "half-true." Each proposition is either true or false, but they collectively constitute a set of true and half propositions.
[13] Also, Fine, 76, takes "ignorance is concerned with "*mē on*" (477a10-11) as meaning that the content of ignorance is a set of propositions that are totally false. These totally false propositions are distinguished from the false propositions that can be content of false beliefs in that the former display one's total ignorance of the subject matter; e.g. if one claimed that justice is a vegetable, it would show one's total ignorance of justice.

belief can be either true or false.[14]

The most important point Fine makes to support her interpretation is as follows.[15] In general, at the outset of dialectical discussion, one should not postulate premises that interlocutors are not supposed to accept.[16] She calls this principle "the condition of noncontroversiality,"[17] and claims that her reading makes it possible to treat Socrates as complying with it. For instance, "knowledge is concerned with "*on*," would only mean that knowledge is always true, which is a premise that the sight-lovers[18] could be happy to accept. By contrast, if we read it existentially or predicatively, Fine contends,[19] Socrates would violate that condition. In the existential reading, "*on*," i.e., the object of knowledge, would mean "what completely exists," whereas "*on te kai mē on*," i.e., the object of belief, would mean "what half-exists." But it is unlikely that the sight-lovers accept the difficult notion of half-existence[20] at the outset of the

[14] Usually, Plato here is taken as being committed to the idea that knowledge is concerned only with Forms whereas belief is concerned only with sensibles. (Hereafter, let us call this idea the Two Worlds Theory.) But Fine does not think so. She does not want to take interpretations that ascribe to Plato the Two Worlds Theory for, amongst others, the following reasons. (1) According to the Two Worlds Theory, since there is no knowledge about the sensible, one cannot know, say, that she is sitting on the chair; so Plato's concept of knowledge would be too narrow. (2) In the *Republic*, there are places that are incompatible with the Two Worlds Theory; first, at VI, 506c, Socrates says that he has only *doxa* about the Good; second, at VII, 520c, the prisoner who has returned to the cave is said to know (*gnōsesthe*) what each of the passing shadows (standing for sensibles) is. Fine, 85-86. See also n. 53.

[15] Moreover, Fine, 73-4, says that both existential and predicative readings would treat Plato as presenting an invalid argument at 477c1-478a3, where the capacities are distinguished in terms of the two criteria. For an objection to this claim, see Gonzalez (1996), 263-67; Santas (1973), 37-38. For another sort of objection, see Ota (2012), 25; Tasaka, n. 13, 68.

[16] For this point, see also Graeser, 411-13. See also Stokes, 110-11, though he attempts to read existentially.

[17] In the paper originally published in 1990, Fine relabels it "dialectical requirement" but the substance remains the same. See Fine, 87.

[18] Penner, 246-49, labels the sight-lovers "nominalists" in the sense that if asked what beauty is, they would name beautiful sensibles but never admit that there is anything like "the beautiful itself" besides them.

[19] Fine, 69-71.

[20] Vlastos (1965), 8-9, and Annas (1981), 196-97, reject the existential reading, believing that "what half-exists" does not make sense in the first place. By contrast, Fronterotta, 140, argues that what is contrasted in the idea of degrees of existence can

discussion. In the predicative reading, "*on te kai mē on*" would mean "what is and is not F," which would refer to, e.g., actions that can be just or unjust depending on situations and circumstances (like telling the truth). But the sight-lovers could not possibly understand why there is no knowledge but only belief about such things.[21]

Although Fine's interpretation is innovative and coherent, as Gonzalez correctly points out,[22] it has two major problems.

First, Fine's interpretation seems anachronistic. It is only those who are familiar with modern philosophy of logic that could possibly think of "*on*" as a set of true propositions and "*on te kai mē on*" as a set of true and false propositions. It is very unlikely that the sight-lovers, who are said to be unwilling to attend discussion (*logoi*) (475d4-6) and hence are supposed to be complete beginners at philosophy, understand "*on*" and "*on te kai mē on*" in the way Fine suggests.[23]

Second, Fine, maintaining that Socrates should not be regarded as postulating premises that are unacceptable to interlocutors *at the outset* of the argument, employs this principle as a reason to refuse other interpretations. But it is arbitrary to privilege *the outset* of the argument in that way because, after all, Fine assumes that Socrates ends up appealing to a totally unacceptable premise to the sight-lovers towards the end of the argument (479e7-480a5), to the effect that one must first know Forms to have knowledge. This premise, which would require pretty much understanding of the theory of the Forms, seems even more unacceptable to the sight-lovers than the premise that knowledge is concerned with what is completely F.[24]

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be unchangeability of the Forms and changeability of the sensible; if so, the "degrees of existence" means the "degrees of eternity" — an idea which may be intelligible. Also, Tonner, 178-83, vindicates the existential reading, arguing that "what half-exists" can make sense because for Plato, "to exist" implies "to exist as something." See also, n. 31.

[21] Irwin (1995), 266-68, basically follows Fine.

[22] Gonzalez (1996).

[23] Santas (1990), 49, makes the same point.

[24] Furthermore, if we took Fine's reading, Plato would be taken as committed to the idea that it is impossible for non-philosophers even to have the most mundane kind of (propositional) knowledge, say, that there is a bird on the tree, since they do not know

3.2. Vlastos' Interpretation

Next, let us consider Vlastos' interpretation, although its publication precedes Fine's. Vlastos takes "be" in the relevant passage predicatively.[25] "What is" (477a1, a2-3, 478d5-7, 479d4) is a generic term for "what is beautiful," "what is just," and so on. And "what is" is paraphrased as "what completely is" (*to pantelōs on*, 477a3) or "what purely is" (*to eiriklinōs on*, 477a7, 478d6, 479d4). This is to say that "what is" is a generic term for the Forms.[26] Such a way of speech implies that the Form of the Beautiful is completely beautiful[27] while things like beautiful sounds and colors are incompletely beautiful. So Vlastos takes it that Plato speaks of how really a thing is beautiful, i.e., of "degrees of reality."

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the relevant Forms. But philosophically speaking, this view looks quite implausible to me; for nobody but radical sceptics would deny that, at least in many cases, we do have that kind of knowledge. (Of course, it is another, quite controversial issue how exactly we could plausibly secure that kind of knowledge, i.e., knowledge concerning, so to speak, the external world, while not retreating to a sort of skepticism which denies its possibility. For a relatively recent discussion on this issue, see esp. Blackburn; Wright; McDowell (1995), (2002); Prichard.) Moreover, I do not find any textual evidence that Plato advocates this view.

[25] Vlastos (1965), esp. 1-9.

[26] Annas (1981), 209-11, is unique in that, although she reads "*on*" predicatively, she believes that the contrast between "what is" and "what is and is not" is not the same as that between the Forms and the sensible: i.e., she includes in "what is" the sensible F things that do not normally appear to be not-F, such as human beings. (As for "knowledge" at issue, like Fine and Vlastos, she understands it as propositional knowledge.) For this line of reading, see White, F. C. (1984), 339-40, as well. Similarly, Nehamas, 176-77, believes that in the *Republic*, Plato postulates Forms only for the things that have opposites, such as beauty and justice. I do not like to take this line because (1) "what is and is not" can be taken as meaning "what is F at a time and is not F at another time" (see also n. 40); and because (2) scattered references to, e.g., the Forms of the Couch (X, 596b1-2), the Three (*Phaedo*,104d5-6), the Shuttle (*Cratylus*, 389b5), and the Man (*Philebus*, 15a4) suggest that Plato was, in general, serious to postulate Forms even for things that have no opposites, even if he might have once wavered in doing so (cf. *Parmenides*, 130c1-4).

[27] This is called the "self-predication" of Forms. Vlastos (1995), 166-190, problematizes this assumption when he analyzes what is called the "Third Man Argument" in *Parmenides*, 132a1-134e7.

Vlastos believes that Plato has a tendency to regard cognitive states, such as knowledge, as a certain sort of correlation with their objects; and for Plato, those cognitive states have characteristics in accordance with those of their objects. For Plato, infallibility (477e7-8) of propositions that are the content of knowledge derives from unchangeability of its object, Forms. For example, "three is odd" is infallible and, hence, can be a content of knowledge because this proposition is true in virtue of the logical connection between the "Three" and the "Odd."[28] In other word, three is odd *because of its being three*. In contrast, "Simmias is taller than Socrates" can be, at most, a content of true belief because Simmias is taller than Socrates, not because of his being Simmias, but because of his happening to participate in the "Tall."[29]

Vlastos complains that this view of knowledge is too narrow. The content of knowledge should not be restricted to the propositions that are of necessity true in virtue of logical connection among concepts; the content can be the kind of refutable propositions that empirical sciences deal with. (That is, Vlastos, as a contemporary philosopher, problematizes whether we can accept Plato's philosophy if it denies knowledge to empirical sciences.)

In empirical sciences, we first set up a hypothesis about things observed by our senses or about what is postulated to explain objects of our observation; and, then, we empirically verify it. Logically speaking, such a hypothesis must be refutable because it is proven to be true only if it has passed through the process of empirical verification. This is to say that it does not have the logical necessity that analytic propositions such as "three is odd" contain. Nevertheless, Vlastos maintains, it is not the case that even sufficiently verified scientific hypotheses cannot be the content of knowledge. He remarks that since the sensible things, objects of empirical sciences can be the object of knowledge, Plato should have spoken of "kinds" of reality instead of "degrees" of it.[30]

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[28] Vlastos (1965), 11-12. He has in mind *Phaedo*, 102a11-c10, 103e9-104b2.

[29] Gulley, 86, also considers the contrast between "knowledge" and "belief" in our passage to be that between a priori knowledge and (so to speak) empirical knowledge. He finds this contrast at issue even in *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*.

[30] Vlastos (1965), 17-19.

I agree with Vlastos that "what is" and "what is and is not" should be taken predicatively, and that they should refer to the Forms and the sensible, respectively.[31] But he, as well as Fine, understands the knowledge Plato has in mind here to be a type of *propositional knowledge*. I will discuss several problems with this kind of reading[32] in the next subsection.

3.3. "Knowledge by Acquaintance" and "Knowledge What"

Following Gonzalez, Smith, and Szaif, I would like to suggest that knowledge in question can be characterized in the following two, equally appropriate, manners. First, it can be described as a certain sort of intuitive grasp of Forms, and, second, as knowledge of what each (of the things for which Forms are postulated) is, such as beauty and justice. One acquires knowledge of what F is when one has intuited the Form of F; I take it that this is exactly the knowledge at issue in our passage.

In order to clarify my claim here, I would like to refer to the three types of knowledge that Hintikka distinguishes. According to him,[33] "knowledge by acquaintance" (e.g. one's knowing Jones in the sense that one has met him) and "knowledge that" (or propositional knowledge) have been traditionally

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[31] Cf. Smith (2012), 61-67; Szaif, 8-11; Sedley (2007), 258. While Gonzalez (1996), 258-62, understands "*on*," at least basically, predicatively, he also argues that the existential reading and the predicative one are compatible and even complementary. According to him, for Plato, for something to "exist" is for it to "be F" and *vice versa*. In this way, he refuses to ascribe to Plato a contemporary notion of "existence," according to which, a sensible thing can exist completely even if it is incompletely, say, beautiful. (For a similar point, see Owen, 71.) Now, "*on*" means "what truly exists" in the existential reading, and "what is completely F" in the predicative reading. Gonzalez regards both readings as equally correct. In the former reading, the aspect of *acquaintance* is highlighted; to know something by acquaintance presupposes existence of the object of acquaintance just as to see something presupposes existence of the object of sight. In the latter reading, the aspect of "knowledge what" is at issue; the soul acquires knowledge of what F is by getting involved with what is completely F. As we will see, since those two aspects of knowledge are correlated, Gonzalez finds those two readings complementary.

[32] For such a reading, see also Cross and Woozley, 174-76. Gerson, 160-61, takes "belief" here as propositional, while he understands "knowledge" as non-propositional.

[33] Hintikka (1974), 31-49.

distinguished; but "knowledge what" is the third kind of knowledge, which is, at least conceptually, different from either of the other two.[34] "Knowledge that," e.g. knowing that Jones is a carpenter, has a proposition as its content, whereas "knowledge by acquaintance" has a particular thing (or concept) as its object. By contrast, "knowledge what," e.g. knowing what Jones is, has a particular thing (or concept) as its object and, at the same time, its content can be identified (at least to a considerable degree) in terms of propositions. For instance, knowing that Jones is a carpenter means that one knows *him* about his profession.

In terms of those three types of knowledge, knowledge for Plato is irreducible to "knowledge that." Rather, it consists in, from a viewpoint, "acquaintance" with Forms and in, from another viewpoint, "knowledge what." (I take those two viewpoints to be two different aspects of the same affair.[35]) This is to say, Plato seems to believe that when one really knows what F is, the content of their knowledge cannot be exhausted by any set of propositions (more on this shortly).

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[34] Smith (1979), 283-87, characterizes the above-mentioned three kinds of knowledge in terms of whether they admit of degrees or not. Since one either knows or does not know a certain proposition, "knowledge that" has no degree. Also, since one is either acquainted with Jones or not, "knowledge by acquaintance" does not seem to admit of degrees. By contrast, "knowledge what" admits of degrees in that one can know what (or who) Jones is either deeply or shallowly. Smith conceives of one's knowing Jones deeply as meaning that one knows many true propositions about his nature. (I do not discuss Smith's paper published in 2000, where he maintains, objecting to interpreters like Gonzalez, that "knowledge that" is also at issue as the concept of "knowledge" here. I find his previous view closer to the truth. Cf. Smith (2000), n. 36, 168.) When Gonzalez (1996) discusses "knowledge" as "acquaintance" in our passage, like Smith, he seems to treat it as admitting of no degrees. But when it comes to discussing epistemology in *Meno*, he regards "acquaintance" as having degrees. Having "acquaintance" with a person or a city is not the state of affairs where one just perceives some sense-data, but to "have some intercourse" with the person or the city. There can be degrees in such acquaintance, from superficial to profound levels. Gonzalez (1998b), 157.

[35] Smith (1979), 283, considers "knowledge" at issue in our passage to be a "blend" of "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge what." In contrast, Gonzalez (1996), n. 24, 258, remarks that the relationship between those two is more of identity, on the ground that for Plato, the content of "knowledge what" should not be exhausted by any set of propositions. I basically agree with Gonzalez, but I am not completely sure whether Smith (1979) really commits himself to the claim that, for Plato, knowledge what is *reducible* to a set of propositional knowledge.

I understand Plato as taking "knowledge" at issue to be consisting in "acquaintance"[36] with Forms because (1) in discussing knowledge in our passage, Socrates resorts to comparison with sight, which is nothing but a type of acquaintance with objects; and because (2) the direct object construction, such as "*tous auta hekasta theōmenous*" at 479e6, is used to describe the state of affairs of knowing.[37] On the other hand, the fact that the nature of knowledge is said to be "to know how what is is" (*gnōnai hōs esti to on*) at 477b11-12 suggests that Plato also treats "knowledge" at issue to be "knowledge what."[38]

I do not like to take the kind of interpretation that holds that "knowledge" is nothing but knowing a certain (set of) proposition(s) for the following two reasons.[39] First, if such a cognitive state were "knowledge" for Plato, the essence of philosophical education would eventually lie in memorizing such propositions, especially definitions of Forms; but Plato does not understand philosophy in that way. As Szaif observes,[40] for Plato, even one's giving a definitional account of a

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[36] Bluck, 259, also makes this point. Hintikka (1967), 6, points out that "*eidenai*," one of the Greek verbs most commonly used for "know," retains the meaning of a certain kind of acquaintance; for it stems from "*horan*" (see). He maintains, while referring to Snell, 25, that in general, when "*eidenai*" was used, the user tended to keep its original sense "see" in mind. For general discussion as to what terms Plato uses for knowledge, see Lyons, 139-228. For a criticism of him, see Rowett, 5-7. For non-propositional features of "belief" in our passage, see Murphy, 103-4; Kanayama (1981), 2-3.

[37] For this construction, see also 476b9-10, 479d10-e1, 479e6.

[38] "*Gnōnai hōs esti to on*" could also read, "to know "what is" as it is."

[39] Wieland, 224-236, also puts an emphasis on importance of non-propositional knowledge in Plato. It is possible to identity, objectify, and communicate the content of propositional knowledge. For these merits, the "propositionalism" (Propositionalisms) is predominant in contemporary philosophy. But, according to Wieland, what is more important in Plato's epistemology is the forms of knowledge whose content is irreducible to any specific proposition, such as experience (Erfahrung), ability (Fähigkeit), power of judgment (Urteilskraftt), and knowledge of use (Gebrauchswissen). The possessor of non-propositional knowledge cannot objectify, separate, or communicate the full content of what he knows in terms propositions. Rather, there is an inseparable relation between non-propositional knowledge and its possessor; who the subject (Subjekt) of that knowledge is is to be revealed by that knowledge itself.

[40] Szaif, 23. While Szaif and Gonzalez agree on many important points about our passage, Szaif's assessment of the Book V argument is different from Gonzalez's. Socrates here appeals to the fact that many beautiful things appear ugly depending on situations, in order to draw the conclusion that "*on te kai mē on*" is the sensible. But

Form could not exhaust one's "familiarity" with that Form.[41]

Further, Socrates at 500d5-501c4 envisages knowledge of the Forms of virtues to be a thing that enables one to enact the constitution in a proper way. But as to any practice including enactment of a constitution, it seems impossible to exhaust how it can be done appropriately in terms of general principles — a point McDowell discusses in places such as "Virtue and Reason." For instance, any general claim that such and such an action is right necessarily admits of exceptions.[42] As McDowell says,[43] "what someone has come to know when he cottons on to a practice" is "uncodifiable." In our interpretation, Plato would be understood as messaging us uncodifiability of knowledge of the Forms by describing it as a thing acquired by acquaintance. And, in fact, as we have seen earlier, Plato does speak of knowledge by appealing to the comparison with sight. Now, to understand "knowledge" as knowing a certain (set of) proposition(s) implies that its content can be exhausted in terms of propositions. But, as we have just seen, it does not seem to be the case. So we risk attributing to Plato a philosophically implausible view if we take "knowledge" as propositional.[44] In contrast, the line of interpretation we take is immune to this difficulty.

Szaif, 10-11, remarks, this argument would not be applicable of the sensible things that have no opposite characters such as fingers (523c10-d6) and human beings; therefore, Socrates actually fails to prove that *any* sensible is mere objects of belief. By contrast, Gonzalez (1996), n.19, 255-56, correctly points out that the claim that a sensible appears both F and not-F can mean that it is *at one time* F and *at another time* not-F (cf. *Symposium*, 211a3); so there is no need to take Socrates' argument as inapplicable of things like fingers.

[41] Gonzalez also believes so. Sorabji, 299-301, criticizes the line of reading that understands Plato's concept of knowledge as acquaintance by appealing to 534b3-c5, where what is at issue seems to be to know the definition of a Form. To this, Gonzalez (1998a), 279-80, rightly responds that what is implied in this passage is only that the one who has knowledge about something is capable of explaining its essence, not that the content of his knowledge is *exhausted* by propositions. See also Rowett, 163-64.

[42] For instance, "one must return what he owes" is untrue if what one owes is a weapon and if the original owner has gone mad (cf. 331c1-8).

[43] McDowell, 73 (for Japanese translation, see 35).

[44] Rowett, 149-50, emphasizes this point. She even suggests that Plato, by describing Socrates and his interlocutor's familiars on this project in various dialogues, hints at how sterile it is to try to find a single definition of a virtue. See Rowett, esp. 26-27, 55-56. See also Ferrari (2015), 12-13.

Now, since the claim that, for Plato, "knowledge" consists in (for one thing) the intuitive grasp of or acquaintance with Forms may cause some misunderstanding, I would like to block it by clarifying what I mean by that claim.

First, I do not mean to say that, for Plato, acquisition of knowledge is a sort of mystic experience that has nothing to do with exercise of reason.[45] Rather, as is implied at VII, 534b3-534d2, Plato considers knowledge to be acquired in the midst of the discursive thinking employed in philosophical dialectic. While the Form is a certain kind of "object," acquisition of acquaintance with it seems to lie, unlike the case where one gets acquainted with physical objects through perception, nowhere else than in giving "*logos*" of the Form in question. (In Chapter 5, I will return to this point and flesh out what it is like to engage in the philosophical dialectic in the *Republic*.)

Second, I do not intend to ascribe to Plato a Moorean intuitionism, either. According to Moore, goodness is indefinable[46] and is knowable only by a sort of direct intuition. To explain this, he appeals to comparison with a color. We are able to understand what, e.g., yellow is like by directly experiencing, i.e., seeing, this color. But there is no definition by learning which those who have never seen yellow become able to understand what yellow is like. While goodness is, unlike yellow, not a natural property (i.e., not a property that natural sciences deals with), Moore believes that goodness and yellow are alike in regard to that point.

This way of explanation suggests that it is pretty easy and common experience for us to acquire intuition for goodness itself.[47] But this would contradict the real state of affairs because there is, as a matter of fact, a lot of disagreement among us as to what the good is and what is good. And this is

[45] While Rowett considers knowledge, for Plato, as not being identical with propositional knowledge, she denies that it is any sort of knowledge by acquaintance. See Rowett, esp. 179. However, in so doing, she seems to have in mind some mystic sort of intuition as knowledge by acquaintance.

[46] Moore, 9 (for Japanese translation, see 113).

[47] Moore, 16-17 (for Japanese translation, see 122-23). When Gosling (1973), 120-39, criticizes the line of interpretation that understands "knowledge" as intellectual intuition for Forms, he seems to have in mind such a Moorean intuitionism. His criticism is irrelevant to our version of "acquaintance" reading.

exactly what Plato emphasizes.

When attributing to Plato the idea that knowledge consists in acquaintance with Forms, it has to be emphasized that he believes its acquisition to be a highly difficult task to achieve. It might sound too optimistic that, in principle, one can understands everything about F by virtue of having acquaintance with the Form of F, but the point is rather that the study of dialectic never becomes complete unless one has reached such an extremely ideal state. McDowell says that recognition of the extreme difficulty of attaining this knowledge would induce "an inspiring effect akin to that of a religious conversion"[48] as well as humility. This is to say that by recognizing that we are still far away from perfect wisdom, we can be inspired to step forward to it as close as possible.

Next, let us turn to "belief" in our passage. I take it that just as the philosopher acquires knowledge of what beauty is by getting acquainted with the Form of the Beautiful, so the sight-lovers acquire belief about what beauty is by getting acquainted with many beautiful things. In both cases, they form their understanding of what beauty is by looking at what they regard as exemplarily beautiful things.[49] I understand *nomima*, which the mass is said to have about beauty, etc., at 479d2-4, to be the exemplarily F things, such as the finest tragic performances, to which they pay attention in forming their understanding of F.

[48] McDowell, 73 (for Japanese translation, see 35).

[49] What about "ignorance"? Smith (2012), paying attention to the fact that knowledge and belief are defined as capacities, considers, more in detail, ignorance by understanding it as a capacity. He takes "what is not" as meaning, e.g., what is not just at all, i.e., what is really unjust; by looking at what is really unjust, for instance, people like Thrasymachus form completely wrong conception or, rather, misconception of what justice is (Smith, *ibid.*, 66). By contrast, Gonzalez (1996), 251, considers "ignorance" to be lack of understanding of justice or beauty. I am also inclined to take this line. For one thing, given Smith's reading, it is difficult to distinguish conceptually ignorance from belief because both are sorts of insufficient understanding of what F is. One might say that if ignorance is lack of understanding of what F is, then, it gets mysterious why ignorance is treated as a capacity in our passage. But I doubt that ignorance is treated as a capacity. For one thing, Socrates and Glaucon never explicitly say so. For another, unlike knowledge and belief, ignorance is not assigned one of the two criteria with which to differentiate capacities, i.e. "*ho apergazetai*" (what it achieves), which might indicate that one can achieve *nothing* about F with ignorance of F. (Matsunaga, 110-13, problematizes whether even "belief" can be really regarded as a genuine capacity.)

For at the preceding passage, 476c1-2, the sight-lovers were described as recognizing (*nomizōn*) many beautiful things but not recognizing (*mēte nomizōn*) the beautiful itself; and again at 479a3, they were said to recognize (*nomizei*) many beautiful things. In this reading, that *nomima* "tumble around" would mean that the things to which the multitude refers when asked what F is can appear both F and not-F.[50]

The philosophers, *as a result of having* knowledge about beauty and justice, are able always to make a true judgment (*anamartēton*, 477e7) in each situation.[51] By contrast, the sight-lovers, as a result of having mere belief about beauty and justice, can make both true and false judgments (*mē anamartēton*, 477e7) in each situation. In this way, although what corresponds to true and false judgments appears in Socrates' argument,[52] I take it that knowledge and belief *by themselves* are the cognitive states whose contents are irreducible to any

[50] Most interpreters understand *nomima* as conventional belief or criteria about beauty or justice; cf. Adam, 343-44; Shorey (1937), 532-33; Cornford (1941), 188; Bloom, 160; Fine, 80, 92-93; Annas (1981), 197-98; Griffith, 184; Halliwell, 127. If so, what is at issue here would be the situation where the content of belief, such as "x is beautiful," can turn true and false depending on circumstances. This may be taken as speaking for the "propositional knowledge" interpretation, as in Iwata, 42-43. (But see Gonzalez (1996), 256. While admitting that what corresponds to propositions is at issue here, he does not take this as speaking for "propositional knowledge" interpretation.) I would like to follow, Szaif, n. 13, 14, who says, "Yet '*nomimon*' can also denote that which is an *object* of belief or acknowledgement. In the present context, the word '*nomimon*' harks back to what was said about the 'lovers of sights and sounds' in the preceding passage DDA [the Doxa-as-Dreaming-Analogy]: that they 'acknowledge (*nomizei*) many beautiful things', but not the beautiful itself (476C2-3)." For this line of reading, see also Waterfield, 201; Tasaka, 61. "*Ta kala kai aischra nomima*" at 589c7 can also be taken as referring to "objects" or "things"; Shorey (1937), 405, translates this as "the things which law and custom deem fair or foul."

[51] "*Ho apergazetai*" (477d2) is, in the case of "knowledge," such pieces of propositional knowledge. Cf. Szaif, 18-19. Gonzalez (1996), n. 35, 264, says that the way of distinction between knowledge and belief at this passage is analogous to the distinction between being awake and dreaming at 475e2-476d6. By this, he seems to mean something like this: i.e., those who are awake, at least in most cases, do not make mistakes in recognizing things in the world, whereas those who are dreaming make many mistakes about them.

[52] Not a few interpreters regard this as indicating that the type of knowledge at issue here is propositional knowledge, on the ground that speech of fallibility or infallibility makes sense only in terms of a proposition, which is either true or false. Cf. Iwata, 42; Ota (2012), 27; Fukuda, 9.

proposition.[53]

Finally, let me briefly summarize my discussion in this chapter. For Socrates, knowledge concerned with F is acquaintance with the Form of F, and at the same time, the sufficient understanding of what F is; while belief is acquaintance with F sensibles and an insufficient understanding of what F is. This implies that for Plato, the content of knowledge is irreducible to any set of propositions.

[53] While Gonzalez' discussion goes in such a manner as to avoid attributing the Two World Theory to Plato, he virtually ascribes to Plato a certain version of it. According to him, "knowledge" is acquired by acquaintance with Forms whereas "belief" is acquired by acquaintance with sensibles. To this extent, he attributes to Plato the idea that "knowledge" is only concerned with Forms whereas "belief" is only concerned with sensibles. Then, how can the problems Fine finds in the kind of interpretation that attributes to Plato the Two Worlds Theory be solved? Gonzalez (1996), 273-74, effectively responds as follows: (1)* The type of knowledge Plato has in mind in our passage is, in the first place, not propositional knowledge; so Plato does not say that propositions such as "I am sitting on the chair" cannot be the content of propositional knowledge; (2)* At 506c, Socrates is, in a sense, bound to the sensible image of the sun and does not fully understand what the Good is, just as the sight-lovers in Book V, who are bound to sensibles, do not fully understand what F is; so it can make sense to attribute some sort of belief to both of them because they are alike in that they have not got acquainted with F-ness itself; further, what is at issue at 520c is not so much knowledge about the shadows (sensibles) as knowledge about their originals (Forms) because what enables one to know what each of the shadows is should be knowledge about their ultimate cause, i.e., Forms.

Appendix to Chapter 1
Have the Sight-lovers Been Persuaded?

Concerning the passage in Book V we discussed in Chapter 1, another question can be raised. Before moving onto this question, let us briefly take a look at the conclusion of the passage at issue. Socrates says:

> We surely won't be striking a false note, then, if we call them "belief-lovers" (*philodoxoi*) rather than "philosophers"? Will they really be so very angry with us for saying so?[54] (480a6-8)

To this, Glaucon replies, "Not if they take my advice. There's no call for getting angry about the truth" (480a9-10). Socrates continues just saying, "Then (*ara*), ..." (480a11). This exchange suggests that Socrates and Glaucon regard the argument in 476e4-480a13 as sufficient to persuade the sight-lovers unless they get unfairly emotional. Here arises the question I will address: can we really take this argument as sufficient to persuade the sight-lovers that they have mere belief?

As far as my knowledge goes, this issue has seldom been tackled by scholars.[55] They rather tend to focus on epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the Book V argument.[56] But since one of the chief purposes of the argument in 476e4-480a13 is no doubt to persuade the sight-lovers,[57] whether they are really persuaded or not ought to be called into question. (Another purpose of the argument would be to explain the distinction between the philosopher and the sight-lovers to Glaucon.)

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[54] Rowe's translation.

[55] An exception is Fine, who touches upon this issue in a footnote. See Fine, n. 22, 81-82.

[56] Interpreters that I considered in Section 3 in Chapter 1, generally speaking, have such a tendency. Notomi (2003), 13, correctly points out a flaw in understanding the present argument while ignoring its context of persuasion. See also Burnyeat (1992), 183-87, who takes the whole *Republic* as "an exercise in the art of persuasion."

[57] Nonetheless, Halliwell (1993), 213, remarks that it is unlikely that the present argument is really designed to persuade the sight-lovers.

One might think that it is difficult to assume that the sight-lovers have been persuaded. Socrates' discussion might seem to ultimately presuppose the theory of Forms, regardless of our interpretation of it. Therefore, it might seem that, to accept that they have mere belief, the sight-lovers must accept the theory of Forms. However, they seem to have been introduced exactly as people who never accept the existence of Forms. I, however, argue that they could be taken as having been persuaded that they have mere belief although they are described as suspending their judgement about the existence of the Forms.

1. How Could the Sight-lovers Accept That They Have Mere Belief?

Given my interpretation of Socrates' argument in V, which was presented in Chapter 1, I will show that sight-lovers can be taken as persuaded that they have mere belief. To do so, I will first provide an outline of the relevant parts of Socrates' argument. It is by heeding these parts of the argument that the sight-lovers are eventually forced to accept that their cognitive state is mere belief. Second, I will consider exactly how they are supposed to understand each step of the argument.

The relevant parts of Socrates' argument can be summarized as follows.

(1) "What completely is" is completely knowable, and "what is not in any way" is wholly unknowable. (477a2-5)
(2) Therefore, knowledge is concerned with "what is," and ignorance with "what is not." (477a10-11)
(3) If there is such a thing as to be and not to be, it lies between "what is" and "what is not"; and the cognitive state concerned with this kind of thing lies between knowledge and ignorance. (477a6-9, a11-b3)
(4) Capacities are distinguished by what they are concerned with and what they achieve. (477c1-d7. Cf. b8-10)
(5) Since knowledge and belief each achieve different things in the sense that

knowledge is infallible, whereas belief is fallible, they are different capacities. So they have different objects (by (4)). So belief is not concerned with "what is" (by (2)) or, for that matter, with "what is not." (477c1-478c6. Cf. 477b4-7)

(6) Belief is darker than knowledge and brighter than ignorance, and so lies between them. (478c7-d12)

(7) Since the sensible such as many beautiful things and just things admit of opposite appearances, they "are and are not." Therefore, belief is concerned with the sensible. (478e1-479d9)

(8)* Those who are only concerned with the sensible only "believe." They are "lovers of belief." (479d10-480a1)[58]

How, then, do the sight-lovers understand each step of the argument?

As we saw, at 477a3-4, Socrates states that "what completely is" is completely knowable, and "what is not in any way" is wholly unknowable ((1) in the above-given analysis). The sight-lovers, I suppose, correctly take this remark as meaning that knowledge of F derives from getting acquainted with what is completely F, while one has mere ignorance of F if one has been only acquainted with totally non-F things. More in details, Socrates' remark here, as is suggested right after this passage, at 477a10-b2 ((2) in the analysis), implies the following general statement concerning knowledge and ignorance: i.e., that there is a correlation between how sufficiently one understands F and how really F the object of acquaintance which results in this understanding is. I assume that the sight-lovers consent both to this general statement and to its application to the cases of knowledge and ignorance.

At this stage of the argument, it does not matter yet what exactly "what is completely F" is. But by this, the sight-lovers would understand, say, the best performance of the finest theatrical piece they know. To this extent, they can still believe that they have knowledge of what beauty is because they are acquainted with "what is completely beautiful."[59]

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[58] Compare (8)* with (8) in Section 2 in Chapter 1.

[59] Gonzalez (1996), 253, is right in pointing out that Socrates does not make the sight-lovers accept the theory of Forms *at the outset* of the argument. But he leaves it

We should not miss the fact that at this stage, when Socrates introduces "what is and is not" in (3), he is careful enough not to involve himself in the question of what exactly it is, as Gonzalez correctly points out.[60] Socrates is merely speaking conditionally: "*If* there is such a thing as to be and not to be, then, …" (my emphasis). So the sight-lovers do not have to consider what kind of thing the phrase refers to. (It is later at 479c6-d1 that the exceedingly beautiful sensible things that they conceive of as "what is completely beautiful" are shown to be merely "what is and is not beautiful.") In this way, I understand Socrates here as turning the sight-lovers' focus on the correlation between the cognitive states and the degrees of F-ness of the objects ― the objects' acquaintance with which results in forming each of those cognitive states.

Next, at 477d1-5, it is implied that capacities are differentiated in terms of difference in "what it achieves" ((4) in the analysis). At 477e7-8, it is agreed that knowledge is infallible (i.e., always produces true judgments) and belief is fallible (i.e., sometimes produces true, sometimes false judgments), which means that knowledge and belief are different in "what they achieve." This way, at 478a1-3, knowledge and belief are said to be different capacities ((5) in the analysis). I take the sight-lovers as accepting this point without difficulties.[61]

At 478c7-d12, they should also accept, without any difficulty, that belief lies between knowledge and ignorance ((6) in the analysis).

Further, in (7) 479a5-b7, Socrates has the sight-lovers realize that what they took to be completely beautiful is actually what is and is not beautiful. The sight-lovers could accept this; as enthusiasts of theater, they should be aware that a theatrical piece that once appeared beautiful may become terrible depending on the circumstances of the performance.[62] So I suggest that the sight-lovers could

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unclear whether Socrates' persuasion, after all, could be successful.

[60] Gonzalez (1996), 253.

[61] Also, they could naturally accept that since knowledge and belief are different capacities, they are concerned with different objects; it would be unlikely that such a huge difference in capacities (i.e., fallibility and infallibility) is brought about through acquaintance with the same object.

[62] At 475d6-8, the sight-lovers are said to run around every chorus of the Dionysia, missing none in the cities or the villages. The Dionysia consisted of the Great Dionysia and the Rural Dionysia. In the Rural Dionysia, the tragedies that were once performed

accept that they are only concerned with "what is and is not," and hence have mere belief ((8)* in the analysis).

2. How Would the Sight-lovers React to the Existence of the Forms?

However, at stage (8)*, how would sight-lovers react to the existence of Forms? Socrates and Glaucon are not explicit on this point. There are at least two interpretations of sight-lovers' reaction to the Forms at this stage. (A) Sight-lovers, while admitting that they have mere belief, suspend their judgement of the existence of the Forms. (B) Albeit vaguely, they have already accepted that the Forms exist.

I am inclined to accept interpretation (A). From 479d2 on, Glaucon stops speaking on behalf of the sight-lovers. In the context where he refers to the Forms (cf.479d10, e2, e6-7, 480a3), Socrates speaks of sight-lovers as a distant "they" and Glaucon and himself as "we."[63] I take this to indicate that, in the dramatic representation, the sight-lovers have not yet recognized the existence of the Forms at this point. It is correct to assert that the sight-lovers accept that they are called "belief-lovers." However, they could accept this while being agnostic as to whether there exists cognitive state knowledge and its correlate, the Forms.

However, turning our attention to Book VI, what Socrates asks Adeimantus to tell the multitude (499e1-500a7, 500d11-e3, 501c5-502a2) is that the philosophers know the Forms and look to them to form their souls and govern a city (500b8-c7, 501b1-7, 501d1-2). This implies that Socrates takes the multitude, of whom the sight-lovers can be a representative type, as being able to understand, even if vaguely, what expressions such as "what is by nature the just, beautiful, moderate, and everything of the sort" (501b2-3) refer to if they receive

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in the City Dionysia were presumed to be replayed. In the City Dionysia, revivals of the same tragedies were banned before 386 B.C. Cf. *OCD* (2nd edn.), 350.

[63] See also "*alēthestata*" at 479d1, which expression Plato often uses to indicate that a certain phase of discussion is over. I owe those observations to discussion with Professor Ferrari.

Socrates' explanation via Adeimantus. In this regard, the sight-lovers are assumed to recognize, at least vaguely, the existence of the Forms.

How could this be possible? I would like to suggest the following. In the "real-time" conversation with Socrates in Book V, the sight-lovers have listened to and accepted only part of his argument (i.e., from (1) to (8)* in the analysis). After this, behind the scenes as it were, it can be imagined that someone like Adeimantus appears before them and tells them that they have not yet received Socrates' argument as a whole. He then asks them to listen to the whole argument, including the omitted part (which is the latter half of (8) in the analysis given in Chapter 1, which establishes the point that the supposed object of knowledge, i.e., "what is," is in fact the Form). They then attend a "supplementary lecture" designed to inform them of the omitted part and conduct reviews that aim to render their understanding of the argument fixed. In so doing, the sight-lovers are finally made to accept Socrates' argument as a whole. In this way, they come to recognize, albeit vaguely, the existence of the Forms. As will be demonstrated shortly, Socrates has already presented sufficient grounds for making the sight-lovers accept this.

It may of course sound speculative to assume that such extra forms of persuasion directed at sight-lovers take place behind the scenes. Socrates, however, emphasizes the importance of allowing one to repeatedly listen to arguments when it comes to fixing a conviction in one's soul. At 608a2-5 in Book X, he implies that against the charm of mimetic poetry, the argument which demonstrates how harmful it is to the soul must be recited many times as a counter-spell. (A similar point is made at *Phaedo*, 77e9-10, where Socrates says that an argument for the immortality of the soul should be told every day to eradicate the fear of death.[64]) What I am suggesting is that this sort of repeated, deliberate attempt at establishing conviction is probably also involved in the course of the discussion with sight-lovers, and that, if this is so, this helps explain why in Book VI sight-lovers are conceived to be a little more intelligent than in Book V in terms of their recognition of the existence of the Forms.

[64] Cf. *Laws*, 891a2-4.

On what grounds, then, could the sight-lovers come to recognize, albeit vaguely, the existence of Forms? First, (a) they could be made to accept that there is the cognitive state of knowledge, which is superior to belief. Otherwise why are they offended to be described as lacking knowledge in the first place (cf. 476d7-8)?[65] Second, (b) as we have seen, they could accept (2), the first half of which states that knowledge is concerned with "what is" (477a10-b3). From (a) and (b), it follows that they could accept the existence of "what is." To this extent, they would be forced to commit to the existence of "what is."[66] At first, they may have had in mind, say, an exceedingly beautiful theatrical piece as "what is beautiful."[67] However, as the argument goes, they have acknowledged that any sensible "is and is not." This much recognition would be sufficient to make them eventually accept that "what is" should be something different from the sensible, such as the strange kind of entity Socrates has been speaking of as "Forms."

In this way, I propose that as a result of experiencing extra persuasion behind the scenes, the sight-lovers have eventually entered an intermediary state of mind regarding the Forms, in which they neither clearly recognize nor reject their existence. For if, on the one hand, they clearly recognize their existence — clearly as the philosophers do — they would at least start philosophizing. If, on the other hand, they continue to reject the existence of Forms entirely, there would be little point in having made them agree that they have mere belief.[68]

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[65] To ensure the sight-lovers accept that knowledge exists, one could also appeal to a common-sense view: for instance, one could point out that it would be odd if there were no knowledge, especially about beauty or justice, although apparently there is knowledge about other things such as health, agriculture, and carpentry.

[66] Fine, n. 22, 81-82, also points out that the sight-lovers can be made to accept the existence of Forms if they accept the existence of knowledge. But she does not go into the details that I discuss in this paragraph; nor does she say anything as to how the sight-lovers would, after all, react to the existence of Forms.

[67] Cf. *Hippias Major*, 287e3-4, where Hippias states that beauty is a beautiful girl.

[68] At 479a1-5, it is said that the sight-lovers do not believe that there exists any Form of the Beautiful. But this just refers back to 476c1-3. As I argue here, it is possible to assume that by listening to Socrates' argument, the sight-lovers' view about Forms have changed in the way I suggest. At 493e2-494a2, Socrates and Adeimantus deny, while referring back to the Book V argument, that the multitude would neither accept nor believe in the existence of the beautiful itself. The multitude's cognitive state at issue here seems to correspond to that of the yet-to-be-persuaded sight-lovers.

I would like to characterize the above-mentioned intermediary state of mind by comparing it with Socrates' account of "summoners of intellect" (*ta parakalounta tēn noēsin*) in Book VII, 523a-524c. Here, "sense" (*aisthēsis*) is said, by way of personification, to proclaim the same thing, say a finger, to be both large and small (compared with a smaller finger and with a larger finger, respectively), and the soul is said to be so perplexed at this coexistence of opposites to call for the help of "intellect" *(noēsis*), which posits largeness and smallness separately and asks what each is. Like the "sense" in the Book VII passage, the sight-lovers in our Book V passage are faced with opposite appearances (in (7) in the analysis). However, they could eventually become a little more intelligent than "sense," because they can be imagined to recognize the existence of Forms, albeit vaguely. However, they are not as intelligent as "intellect" in the Book VII passage because they would not go on to posit relevant intelligibles and ask what each of these is.

"Intellect" in the Book VII passage is the thing which, ultimately, leads one to philosophy. But the sight-lovers would, as long as they remain sight-lovers, never head for philosophy to get beyond the state of belief. Certainly, it may be possible that those who were once sight-lovers, by some chance, become philosophers. But the aim of the argument in V, 476e4-480a13, is not to change the sight-lovers into philosophers. It is, rather, to make them acknowledge that their cognitive state is mere belief.

3. An Implication in the Fact that the Sight-lovers Could Have Been Persuaded

For the rest of the Appendix, I would like to address the following question: if Socrates could have persuaded the sight-lovers that they lack knowledge, as I have argued, then what does this fact mean for the broader context in the *Republic*, in particular, Socrates' conception of the ideal city?

It is true that people exactly like the sight-lovers will not be found in

Callipolis. They are introduced as people familiar to Socrates and Glaucon: they would be, typically, the kind of contemporary Athenians who enjoy going see theatrical performances such as tragedies. And the tragedies, which are likely to be their favorite things to see, are prohibited in Callipolis, as are other forms of poetry, such as comedies.[69]

However, let us consider the producers in Callipolis, who constitute it as well as the rulers and the fighters. (And to avoid complication, for now, let us leave the fighters aside.) Like the sight-lovers, the producers, or at least most of them, are not philosophers; that is, they lack knowledge. Now, the fact that the sight-lovers could have been persuaded implies that in Callipolis, a similar kind of argument could induce the producers to agree that they lack knowledge, which is concerned with something significant called "what is," and to accept that since their rulers probably possess knowledge, they seem qualified to rule them. And in fact, when Socrates proceeds to show Glaucon that the philosophers, not belief-lovers, should rule the city at the beginning of Book VI, he does appeal to the conclusion of the Book V argument, that the philosophers are concerned with the Forms while the belief-lovers are with the sensible (484b4-7).[70] I suggest that the Book V argument, or at least a similar form of argument to it, would play such a role in the context of persuading citizens in Callipolis.[71]

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[69] See Socrates' critique of poetry in II, 376e1-III, 412b2 and in X, 595a1-608b3. In the latter place, on the grounds that tragedy and comedy corrupt the souls of their listeners (595b3-7, 605c5-7), their performances are prohibited in Callipolis (607a3-7, 607c4-7, cf. 398a1-b4).

[70] It is interesting that Glaucon seems unable immediately to decide which of the two kinds of people should rule the city at 484b8. (I owe this observation to discussion with Professor Ferrari.) I interpret his uncertainty in the following way. Judging from Socrates' way of speech, Glaucon must be aware that Socrates expects him to answer that the philosophers should be rulers. But in the preceding argument in Book V, it is belief, the cognitive state ascribed to the belief-lovers, that was correlated with the sensible things. And in any case, the job of guardians seems most obviously concerned with things in the sensible realm, such as protecting citizens from enemies and enacting or protecting laws. Those two considerations popping up at the same time, it seems to me, prevent Glaucon from deciding immediately.

[71] At III, 414d4-415c7, Socrates suggests persuading, first, the rulers and, then, the rest of the city that the god, in fashioning those who are competent to rule, mixed in gold at their birth; in auxiliaries, silver; and in producers, iron and bronze. To let the producers believe this story is another way to have them agree to the governance of the present

Their agreement on this point would contribute to the promotion of agreement (*homonoia*) among all three classes as to who ought to rule the city. This agreement is called the *sōphrosynē* of the city (432a6-b1). Generally, in 484a1-502a3, Socrates takes care to present the competence of the philosophers in a manner that is intelligible to non-philosophers.[72] For example, he frequently appeals to figurative speech:[73] at 484c1-d9, he compares the philosophers to people with keen eyesight and the non-philosophers to blind people; at 487e4-489c7, he compares political governance to navigation to make it clear that the philosophers are considered to be useless not because they are incompetent but because the existing cities do not try making use of them; the current situation of political governance is like the one where those who are skilled in navigation (i.e., the philosophers) are dismissed, whereas sailors with no such skill coax the shipowner (i.e., the mass) into letting them control the ship; and at 500d5-501c4, Socrates compares philosophers' construction of the constitution of a city while looking at the Forms of the Just and Beautiful to painting a picture while looking at models.

Those vivid manners of speech designed to illustrate competence of the philosophers are certainly directed, for one thing, at Socrates' immediate interlocutors, Glaucon and Adeimantus, but also at the multitude that Socrates is speaking to via his conversation with them.

In Plato's dialogues, we can find his wish to let as many people philosophize as seriously as possible. (In *Apology*, 23b4-7, 29e3-30a7, Socrates presents his own lifestyle as the one who interrogates anybody and invites them to philosophy.) But the ideal city that is presented in the *Republic* is not the city where everyone philosophizes; Plato also holds a pessimistic, elitist recognition that only very few can be philosophers (cf. 491a8-b2, 493e2-494a4). So Plato has to consider how a city, many of whose citizens are non-philosophers, can nevertheless be governed on the basis of philosophical knowledge. In connection with this, it is an important task for Socrates' conception of Callipolis to have the

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rulers.

[72] Cf. 489a7-b1, 501c5-9.

[73] Notomi (2003), 21-22, mentions Socrates' frequent use of images for persuasion.

producers agree that the current rulers are the right people to rule. I would like to suggest that the persuasion of the sight-lovers at 476d7-480a13 can be taken to concern this political issue. It can do it as an initial step of the series of arguments designed to vindicate the idea that philosophers' rule is the best course of political action.

Chapter 2
Description of the Good at VI, 505e1-2

In the previous chapter, I considered the conception of knowledge in Socrates' argument toward the end of Book V. Before moving on to the Simile of the Sun and the Divided Line, two passages which I believe are crucial in discussing Plato's epistemology in the *Republic*, I will scrutinize Socrates' description of the Good at VI, 505e1-2. As will be shown, this passage attributes to Plato a view to the effect that every soul always seeks for the Good at least at a "deep" level of their soul. This function of the soul, in most cases performed unconsciously, cannot be exhausted by knowing (or, for that matter, believing) propositions.

After identifying "the most important thing to learn" with the Good at *Republic*, VI 505a2, Socrates gives a preliminary description of it at e1-5, before famously comparing it to the sun at VI 507a7-509b9. The opening part of the description goes as follows:

> Every soul pursues [the Good] and does whatever it does for its sake (*ho de diōkei men hapasa psychē kai toutou heneka panta prattei*, e1-2). It divines that [the Good] is something (*apomanteuomenē ti einai*, e2) but is perplexed (*aporousa de*, e2) and cannot adequately grasp what it is (*kai ouk echousa labein hikanōs ti pot' estin*, e2-3) …[74]

In this chapter, I present an interpretation of this oft-discussed passage and offer a view on related issues, considering Ferber's relatively recent, illuminating discussion as my starting point.[75] Ferber believes that 505e1-2 commits Plato (or the character Socrates) to a fundamentally "intellectualist" moral psychology; however, I do not believe it does because we do not necessarily have to interpret

[74] Grube and Reeve's translation with modifications.
[75] Ferber (2013).

the passage as Ferber does. Nevertheless, he seems to be right in ascribing an "intellectualist" position to the author of the *Republic*. I believe that to show how such a position is consistent with the recognition of acrasia, one has only to ascribe, as Ferber himself does, to Plato the view that every human intention is, if not actually, at least *virtually* directed toward the realization of the Good. Further, I argue that ascription of this view to Plato is the key to understanding both 505e1-2 and e2-3.

1. Two Translations of "*panta prattei*" and Ferber's Reading

In this section, I will explain how Ferber interprets "*toutou heneka panta prattei*" ("[every soul] does whatever it does for the sake of [the Good]"), which appears at 505e1-2. According to Ferber, there are two ways of translating "*panta prattei*" (for which the translation that I have tentatively cited has: "does whatever it does"): either as (1) "does (literally) everything it does,"[76] or (2) "goes to all lengths."[77] Ferber favors reading (1) while I prefer (2) (see Section 2).

What does the whole phrase "*toutou heneka panta prattei*" mean on readings (1) and (2), respectively? First let us consider the case of reading (1). The phrase means that every soul does (literally) everything it does for the sake of the Good. That is to say, *everyone* does everything he/she does for the sake of the Good, and this is a statement of the general theory of human action. As I have said, this is how Ferber understands the phrase.

That statement is strongly reminiscent of the intellectualist position advocated in earlier dialogues such as *Protagoras*, 358c6-d2, *Gorgias*, 468b7-8, and *Meno*, 78b1-2, which is to say that every wrongdoing is due to the ignorance of what is good, and that nobody does wrong willingly. Does this then mean that Plato has retained his early intellectualism through Book VI of our middle

[76] Shorey (1937), 91; Cornford (1941), 216; Waterfield, 231; Griffith, 211.
[77] Apelt, 259; Wiegand, 239; Gabrieli, 234; Irwin (1977), 336; Burnyeat (2006), 14.

dialogue?

One might think that this cannot be the case. Previously, in the same dialogue, at IV, 439d4-440a8, Socrates said that the soul has three parts or elements, that is, reason, spirit, and appetite, which can *conflict* with one another. For instance, appetite draws the agent to drink something, while reason keeps him/her from doing so. Such a conflict might result in an acratic action. Thus, in *Republic* IV, Plato seems to deviate from his early intellectualism.[78]

However, Ferber suggests that we could understand Plato as retaining intellectualism ― if not the same form of intellectualism found in early dialogues, then what may be called a basic insight of intellectualism ― through *Republic* VI and even further.[79] To do so, Ferber considers the point that every *soul* does everything for the sake of the Good as applying to each *part* of the soul. That is, each part does everything under the guidance of its own conception of what is good. Reason takes something *really good* as what is good, spirit something *honorable*, and appetite something *pleasurable*. Therefore, according to Ferber, Plato has retained, from his early to middle to late period, the basic insight of intellectualism to the effect that every human soul, *or at least each part of it*, aims for the Good. To support this "unitarian" interpretation of Plato's moral psychology, Ferber cites assertions of the intellectualist view that appear later in the *Republic* (IX, 589c6) and in later dialogues (*Philebus* 22b6-8, *Timaeus* 86d7-e3, and *Laws* V, 731c3-5, IX, 860d1-2).[80]

Next let us consider what the phrase "*toutou heneka panta prattei*" means on reading (2). That is, what does it mean to say that every human soul "*goes to all lengths*" for the sake of the Good? According to Ferber, this implies that every human soul (or, I would add for Ferber, the best, i.e., rational, part of the human soul) "leaves nothing undone" for the sake of the good. As Ferber says, if this passage were read in this way, Plato would be breaking with his early

[78] For example, Anagnostopoulos, 180-83, argues that while for Socrates (as depicted in Plato's early dialogues) one can only desire what is good, for Plato in the *Republic* one sometimes desires what one falsely takes to be good.
[79] Ferber (2013), 236.
[80] Ferber (2013), 236.

intellectualism, and indeed, Plato's recognition of acratic action in Book IV would indicate such a break. Another indication would be in our very passage if it were read as just described. For, as a matter of fact, acratic action does exist. So, if the rational part of everyone's soul leaves (literally) nothing undone for the sake of what it takes to be good, this should mean that anyone's[81] best judgment can be overthrown by impulse. In this way, Plato would be giving a psychological account of acrasia. The interpreters who perceive such a development in Plato's moral psychology include Vlastos, Davidson, Penner, Rowe, and Burnyeat.[82]

2. The "Goes to All Lengths" Translation Consistent with Plato's Retaining the Basic Insight of Intellectualism

I would like to follow Ferber in assuming that Plato retains what may be called a basic insight of his intellectualism in the *Republic*, although what I call such does not perfectly overlap with what he does (more on this below). This assumption is supported by passages from later writings as cited in the previous section.[83] However, I am reluctant to assume, as Ferber does, the words "*panta prattei*" at 505e1-2 as meaning "does (literally) everything it does" (i.e., reading (1)), for "*panta prattein*" and similar expressions such as "*panta poiein*" and "*pan poiein*" often mean "to do everything *to achieve the relevant goal*" (i.e., "to go to all lengths" or "to make every effort"), rather than "to do everything *that the agent does*" (see *Apology* 39a1, *Meno* 89e7, *Phaedo* 114c3, *Republic* 488c2, 504d8-9, and *Philebus* 58d5).[84] There are certainly exceptions, for example, *Gorgias* 468b7-8, where a general theory of action is at issue.

Now, Ferber speaks as if the "goes to all lengths" translation were

[81] This is what Ferber thinks. However, one might believe that a virtuous person's best judgment cannot be overthrown by impulse.
[82] Vlastos (1991), 45-80; Davidson, 225-6; Penner and Rowe, 222; Burnyeat (2006), 18-19.
[83] One can add *Laws* IX, 860d5-e4.
[84] For this usage, see Irwin (1977), 336.

incompatible with his "unitarian" interpretation.[85] This seems to be because he regards the "goes to all lengths" translation of 505e1-2 as unambiguously meaning that every soul — that is, the best part of everyone's soul — "leaves (literally) nothing undone" for the sake of the Good. However, this is only one of two possible ways of taking the "goes to all lengths" translation itself (let us call that reading (2-a)). Another way is by taking it to mean "every soul makes every effort" (in which case "*panta*" (everything) is used hyperbolically; let us call this reading (2-b)). It is possible, and seems to me plausible, to translate 505e1-2 as "every soul makes every effort for the sake of the Good."[86] So read, the passage by itself does not commit Socrates to an anti-intellectualist (or, for that matter, intellectualist) moral psychology. I will return to the issue of how I eventually interpret this passage.

3. How Exactly Recognition of Acrasia Is Consistent with Intellectualist Insight

As we have observed, Ferber suggests, in rather cautious terms,[87] that, in order to show how Plato's recognition of acratic action in *Republic* IV is consistent with a basic insight of intellectualism, Socrates' claim at 505e1-2 about a whole *soul*, which Ferber takes as committed to intellectualism, can be taken to apply to each *part* of the soul. To me, however, this extended application seems stretched, for, generally speaking, talk of a whole soul and talk of a part of it are different.[88]

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[85] Ferber (2013), 234-35.
[86] Gabrieli, 234.
[87] Ferber (2013), 236, says, "we *could* say: Not only every simple soul, but also every tripartite soul, does everything for the good" (italics added).
[88] Stalley, 63-64, points out that Bobonich and others have regarded each part of the soul as "agent-like," that is, as having its own desire and cognitive capacities such as beliefs and some form of reasoning. However, as Bobonich himself admits, this view causes a serious problem as to how to explain acrasia. If each part of the soul has its own desire and beliefs, it would seem that acrasia could happen again *within* it. Stalley avoids this problem by understanding that neither appetite nor spirit but reason alone

However, we do not have to take this risky line. Actually, one of Ferber's points suffices to demonstrate consistency between a basic insight of intellectualism and recognition of acrasia. Ferber interprets 505e1-2 as meaning that every soul does everything it does — I add for Ferber, *at least — virtually* (as opposed to *actually*) for the sake of the Good.[89] That is, although we do not always think about the Good explicitly, our every intention is guided by our concern with the Good, and this concern is always working at least at a deep level of the soul. To elucidate this idea, Ferber mentions Aquinas' point that "the force of our first intention with respect to [the ultimate end] persists in each desire, even though it is not adverted to."[90] Regarding the idea that our concern with the Good is always working at least virtually, Ferber could have referred to what Socrates says at VII, 518c4-519b5, that is, that every human soul has the innate capacity to see the truth, a capacity that may or may not be activated, depending on which direction the soul turns.[91] Certainly, this passage does not explicitly concern action or volition, but cognition, whereas 505e1-2 concerns action and volition, and possibly cognition as well. But from Ferber's reading, both passages are related to a deep level of the soul.

Although, as I have stated, I am reluctant to agree with Ferber's interpretation of "*panta prattei*" at 505e1-2 (based on reading (1)), I eventually follow him in recognizing what may be called a basic insight of intellectualism in the same passage. I will return to this point below. For now, let it suffice to say that I agree with Ferber in ascribing the view to Plato in the *Republic*. I cite 518c4-519b5 as evidence that Plato has a view *congenial* to the sort of idea that Ferber and I ascribe to Plato, to the effect that our concern with the Good is always working at least virtually. This sort of idea may also be called a basic

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has beliefs about the good.

[89] Ferber (2013), 239-40.

[90] *ST,* 1a2ae, q. 1, art. 6. Gilby's translation.

[91] Harte (2008) observes a similar idea in the fact (as she takes it) that in the Analogy of the Cave (VII, 514a1-517a7) the prisoners' words are supposed to refer to real things outside the cave. She suggests that to explain this puzzling situation, we should assume that each prisoner has some implicit cognitive grip of real things from the beginning. As Harte points out, this idea is congenial to the theory of recollection (*Meno* 81c5-e2, *Phaedo* 721e-73b2, and *Phaedrus* 249b5-250c4).

insight of intellectualist moral psychology (the other being that every human soul, *or at least each part of it*, aims for the Good).

This enables us to explain how, for Plato, recognition of acrasia is consistent with intellectualist insight. The basic insight of intellectualism concerns our *at least virtual* concern with the Good, which is supposed to be working regardless of whether one is acting or not, and regardless of whether one acts, when one does, *acratically* or not.

4. Why the Soul Is Perplexed

The phrase that I have focused upon so far, "*toutou heneka panta prattei*" (505e1-2), is followed by "*apomanteuomenē ti einai*, *aporousa de kai ouk echousa labein hikanōs ti pot' estin*" ("[every soul] divines that [the Good] is something but is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is," e2-3). In this section, I will elucidate the meaning of this phrase. In so doing, I will appeal to the suggestion that Ferber and I make, that is, that for Plato, we have a certain concern with the Good, which is always working at least at a deep level of the soul. This creates a connection between the foregoing three sections and the present one. For the same sort of idea is at work, I suggest, both in 505e1-2 and e2-3.

When Socrates says that every human soul "divines that the Good is something," he means that everyone has some inarticulate understanding of, or presentiment about, the Good.[92] As we observed in the previous section, Socrates will say later at VII, 518c4-519b5 that every human soul has the innate capacity of seeing the truth. It seems plausible to say that this potential knowledge of all truth (including truth about the Good) brings everyone a vague understanding of the Good.

When Socrates goes on to say at 505e2-3 that every human soul "is

[92] As for *Socrates'* divining about the Good, Ferber (2013), 236-37, argues that it is between *doxa* and *epistēmē*. Compare Gonzalez (1996), n. 50, 273.

perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what [the Good] is," he seems to be speaking about what happens when one is inclined or forced to *express verbally* one's inarticulate understanding of the Good. The word "*aporousa*" (is perplexed) is reminiscent of the experience that a subject of Socrates' questioning typically has.[93] We already have some grasp of the Good, but this grasp is weak, and Socratic examination confirms that this is so. That we are in this intermediary state regarding the cognition of the Good explains why our soul "is perplexed." The soul would not be perplexed if it had either no presentiment about the Good at all or a clear understanding of it. Our perplexity is a *ratio cognoscendi* of the presence of some understanding of the Good in us.

If I am right in suggesting that at work at 505e2-3 is the idea of our at least virtual concern with the Good, this seems to support Ferber's view that a similar idea is (already) present in e1-2. It is by this route that I concur with his view, and not by following his apparently risky interpretation of "*panta prattei.*"

5. Conclusive Remarks

To conclude, I first address a further issue and then summarize my discussion in this chapter.

The preliminary description of the Good, the first part of which I have discussed in this chapter, goes on to say: "[nor can the soul] acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things" (505e3-5). Like many interpreters, I take "other things" to refer to the Beautiful and the Just. Therefore, here Socrates is saying that our beliefs about the Good are less stable than our beliefs about the Beautiful and the Just. What constitutes the difference between the two cases?

For the moment, I suppose that regarding the latter case, we tend to be satisfied with what is generally accepted as just and beautiful in our society. Mostly, our concern for justice is motivated by our fear of being punished or by

[93] For descriptions of perplexity that Socrates brings up, see esp. *Laches* 200e1-201b5, *Gorgias* 522b2-c3, *Meno* 79a-80d4, and *Theaetetus* 149a6-10, 150b6-151d6.

our fear that the current social order is disrupted by others' unjust doings. Our conventional conception of justice suffices to meet either concern. Moreover, for the most part, our interest in beauty derives from our desire to take pleasure in beautiful things or to look beautiful to others. Again, in either case, all that usually matters is society's shared sense of beauty.

What, then, about the Good? True, our beliefs about what is good for each of us or for our happiness are also, for the most part, shaped in terms of what our society takes to be happiness. At VI, 492b1-4, Socrates describes the multitude as educating all the people in such a way as to make them exactly as it wants them to be, which seems to imply that even our beliefs about the Good are, to a great degree, molded by our society.[94] However, compared with beliefs about the Just or the Beauty, our beliefs about the Good seem prone to be shaken. That is, insofar as our concern is to be *really* happy, we may, at least occasionally, feel unsatisfied with what our society merely accepts as happiness or what is good.

A question thus arises. What is the relationship between our concern to be really happy and our (at least virtual) concern with the Good, to which I have drawn attention in this chapter? Tentatively, I would suggest that our concern to be really happy is a form of actualizing the abovementioned concern with the Good, coming about when our concern with the Good has strengthened enough to rise from the deep to the surface levels of our souls.

Finally, to summarize my discussion, Ferber, on the one hand, reads "*toutou heneka panta prattei*" at VI, 505e1-2 as meaning that every soul does literally everything it does for the sake of the Good, and, hence, as committed to intellectualism. In contrast, I would like to interpret the phrase as meaning that every soul makes every effort for the sake of the Good, and, hence, as uncommitted to intellectualism. Ferber's reading is that everyone does everything *virtually* for the sake of the Good. I follow him in ascribing this *view* to the author of the *Republic*. This version of intellectualism, which may be called a basic insight of intellectualism, is compatible with the recognition of

[94] Cf. 493a6-c8.

acratic action shown in IV. Ascription of this view to Plato is the key to understanding both 505e1-2 and e2-3.

Chapter 3
"The Form of the Good" in the Simile of the Sun, 509b7-9

In Chapter 1, I gave an interpretation of *Republic* V, 476d7-480a13 and maintained that, for Plato, although knowledge derives from an acquaintance with the Forms, it can be brought about only in the midst of exercising reason (i.e., the philosophical dialectic). To expand upon this claim, I will provide an interpretation of epistemology and metaphysics in Books VI-VII by considering the Simile of the Sun and the Divided Line.

First, I will examine a passage in the Simile of the Sun and address an oft-overlooked issue regarding the Form of the Good. In so doing, I will point out that, for Plato, for something to be good is for its components to be unified. As will be shown in Chapter 5, my interpretation of the philosophical dialectic presupposes this general view. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will discuss the Divided Line, where I will occasionally refer to the Analogy of the Cave. To begin, I briefly scrutinize the broader context in which Socrates speaks of the Form of the Good in the *Republic*.

In IV, 503e1-505a3, Socrates claims that it is insufficient for those who are to be the rulers of the ideal city (Callipolis) to learn only the definitions of virtues given in 442b10-444a9. They must take "a longer way round" (*makrotera periodos*, 504b2) to reach "the most important thing to learn," namely "the Forms of the Good" (*he tou agathou idea*, 505a2). After making several points explaining how important and difficult it is to study the Good (503a3-506d7), Socrates explains the Good and its study through (a) the Simile of the Sun, (b) the Divided Line, and (c) the Analogy of the Cave. Each is now described in turn.

(a) Socrates states that, like the visible realm, where the sun enables the eye to see visible things and brings about their growth, in the intelligible realm the Form of the Good enables the soul to know intelligible things (Forms) and brings about their being.

(b) Socrates claims that, as there are two types of cognition in relation to

visible things, namely cognition of originals and less clear cognition of their images, so there are two types of cognition in relation to intelligible things, namely dialectic and mathematical sciences, the latter being less clear than the former (509d1-511e5). The dialectic is said to be superior to the mathematical sciences because (1) unlike geometry it does not employ visible images as an aid and (2) the mathematical sciences start from hypotheses (*hypotheseis*) but give no account of them, whereas the dialectic does away with hypotheses one after another, thus reaching "the unhypothesized principle" (*archē anypothetos*, 510b6-7).

(c) Socrates states that, with regard to education, we are like a prisoner who has been chained at the bottom of a cave and has never seen anything other than the shadows cast on the wall. When he is released from the chains and walks out of the cave, he sees things outside the cave (i.e., things in the intelligible realm) and finally gazes at the sun (the Good) directly (VII, 514a1-516c2). However, Socrates also states that those who have been educated to become rulers of Callipolis must not remain in a life of contemplation after seeing the Good, they must return to the cave and rule the prisoners (519c8-521b11). In VII, 521c-541b5, where the main topic shifts to the educational program for those who are to become ruler-fighters and their duties after education, Socrates again refers to the Good in connection to their mode of governance.

In the remainder of this chapter, I address an interpretative question of the Form of the Good, one brought about by a famously cryptic passage in the Simile of the Sun.

1. Two Ways of Speaking of the Form of the Good: Raising an Issue

First, it is important to note that there are two ways of speaking of "the Form of the Good" (= "the Good" (*to agathon*) or "the Good itself" (*auto to agathon*)) in dialogues such as the *Republic*. "The Good" is sometimes spoken of as (1) one Form among others such as the Beautiful and the Just, and sometimes

as (2) the special Form that transcends all the other Forms.[95][96] For (1), see *Phaedo*, 65d4-8, 75c9-d4, 76d7-9, 77a3-5, 100b5-7, *Cratylus*, 439c7-d2, *Republic*, 476a1-6, 507b4-7, *Parmenides*, 130b3-10, 134b14-c2, 135c9-d1. For (2), see 509b7-9 in the Simile of the Sun in Book VI. Here Socrates famously says, "the Good is not being, but is even beyond being in rank and power" (*ouk ousias ontos tou agathou, all' epi epekeina tēs ousias presbeia[i] kai dynamei hyperechontos*, 509b7-9). (I take "being" (*ousia*) as a generic term for Forms.)

What does it mean that "the Form of the Good" is spoken of in those two different ways? It might be the case that Plato has in mind two distinct items, albeit using the same term, "the Good."[97] However, for the following reason, I argue that the same item is spoken of in two ways and that the difference merely reflects differences in certain aspects.

Indisputably, *the principal topic* in the series of discussions in *Republic*, VI-VII is a *single* item, i.e., the Good that is referred to as "the most important thing to study" (505a2). However, in saying this, I do not exclude the possibility that in this discussion, the Good, which differs from that single item, appears as a non-principal topic. In particular, I do not exclude the possibility that what Socrates is referring to, according to the mode of speech (1) at 507a7-b7, is the Good as a non-principal topic and the possibility that it is distinct from the Good as the principal topic. (In this way, I am not begging the question.)

Now, what is spoken of as (2) the special Form that transcends all the other Forms at 508a4-509b9 is without doubt the Good as *the principal topic* in the

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[95] Fujisawa (1998), 126-28.

[96] As will be demonstrated, according to my interpretation, while the Form of the Good is a member of the system of all Forms (aspect (1)), it also plays a special role in unifying it and hence making it good (aspect (2)). Therefore, it can be said that the Good, when it unifies the system of all Forms, stands above *itself* as an element to be unified and gives a certain place to *itself*. This might sound odd but it is possible for a thing that belongs to a whole to simultaneously be the cause of its unification, just as a general can unify the army to which he belongs as a member.

[97] Fujisawa, *ibid*., treats the Good spoken of in (1) to be the Form that is the opposite of the Form of the Bad, whereas he considers the Good spoken of in (2) to be a yet more fundamental value that grounds both the Good and the Bad while transcending the mundane distinction between goodness and badness.

series of discussions. If it is assumed, contrary to my own view, that Socrates distinguishes the Good in sense (1) from the Good in sense (2) as distinct items, the principal topic in the series of discussions would then be the Good in sense (2), *which is distinct from the Good in sense (1)*. Such Good would be *nothing but* the cause of intelligibility and being of the Forms (509b5-7). Therefore, such Good would be understandable only from the viewpoint in which to posit the realm of Forms as such and to consider its internal conditions. By contrast, the Good in (1) would be understandable even without such a viewpoint, e.g., by appealing to our mundane grasp of goodness and to the general principle concerning postulation of Forms, to the effect that we postulate the Form of F for many f things.

However, Socrates, when introducing the above-mentioned principal topic at 504a4-507b10, characterizes it by appealing to our understanding of goodness, which does not presuppose the viewpoint in which to postulate the realm of Forms and consider its internal circumstances. For instance, he characterizes it by stating that some identify the Good as pleasure and others as wisdom (505b6-d4), or that, whereas for beauty or justice one becomes satisfied with what *appears* to be so, for goodness one pursues what *is* good (505d5-506a3).[98] This would be extremely misleading if it were introducing the Good in sense (2), *which is not the Good in sense (1)*. However, I believe there is no reason to believe Socrates is committing himself to such a misleading manner of speech. Therefore, the assumption made earlier was wrong: it is *not* that there are two distinct items, (1) and (2), which both happen to be called the Good. Rather, (1) and (2) should be understood as two *aspects* of the same item, the Good.

But how can we understand (1) and (2) as two aspects of the same item?

2. The Outline of My Interpretation

To address this question, I offer the following interpretation of the passage,

[98] See also Chapter 2.

of which I will first provide a brief outline.

In general, the Form of F is the cause (*aitia*) of something being F (*Phaedo*, 100b1-101d3). Thus, what makes something F is its participation in the Form of F. As such, the Form of the Good is the cause of a good thing being good. Of the two aspects of the Form of the Good, this point is concerned with (1).

The realm of intelligibles or the totality of Forms is an (arguably extremely) good thing (this being expanded on later). What makes it good is, naturally, the Form of the Good, which, by making the totality of Forms good, provides each Form with its being and intelligibility (this also being expanded on later). Of the two aspects of the Form of the Good, this point is concerned with (2).

"The Good is not being" (509b7-8) is only concerned with the Good as the cause, in virtue of which the totality of Forms is good, i.e., with aspect (2) of the Form of the Good. As the Good which is the cause of the goodness of good things in general, i.e., in relation to aspect (1), it does belong to "being."

I contend that the above interpretation understands (1) and (2) as two aspects of the same item, the Good. As previously shown, this interpretation has the advantage of making it possible to understand (1) and (2) as two aspects of the same item. (I argued why we *should* take this line in Section 1.) Moreover, as will be shown, when fleshed out appropriately this interpretation will coincide with a fundamental insight Plato's philosophy contains and bring about a coherent understanding of epistemology and metaphysics in *Republic*, VI-VII.

I will now present my interpretation in more detail by fleshing out this outline. In so doing, I will provide evidence every time I attribute a certain view to Plato. However, because the passage at issue in *Republic*, VI-VII is especially concise and difficult, any interpretation of it, including my own, is destined to be somewhat speculative. Within these limitations, I will strive to render my discussion as persuasive as possible.

In the outline shown, the following two points have to be substantiated. (A) The totality of all Forms is good. (B) The Form of the Good, by making the totality of all Forms good, provides each Form with its intelligibility and being. In Section 3, I will first substantiate (A). I will substantiate (B) later in Chapter 5,

in which I present my interpretation of "the unhypothesized principle" (510b6-7) on which my discussion of (B) rests.

3. Goodness as Being Unified

Why is it that (A) the totality of Forms is good? My explanation is as follows: (A1) For Plato, for something to be good is for its components to be unified;[99][100] and (A2) the totality of Forms is unified.

In the remainder of this section, I will provide evidence for (A1) and (A2), respectively.

It is a late dialogue, *Philebus*, which expresses most clearly the idea that I attribute to Plato in (A1). In 23e1-26d10, Socrates argues that good things such as health, music, and seasons come into being when "unlimited" (*apeiron*) (e.g., hotter and colder, drier and wetter, acuter and graver, and quicker and slower) is bound by "limit" (*peras*) (such as ratio).[101] Furthermore, in 62a2-64e4, good human life is said to be brought about when all kinds of knowledge and certain kinds of due pleasures are mixed together with "measurement" (*metron*).

But not only *Philebus*. *Gorgias*, a supposedly early dialogue, and even

[99] However, it is certainly not the case that one can acquire "knowledge" (*epistēmē*, 506c6) of what the good is if only one understands that the Form of the Good is the very thing that forms each of the good things by unifying its components. To have knowledge of what the good is, one would have to fully understand how components of a given good thing are unified; but this would be an extraordinarily difficult task. Now, if Plato regards the Form of the Good itself as something good, this good thing may be an exception to the general statement at issue. Thus, for the Good to be good might *not* be for its components to be unified, for the Good might not have any component in the first place. In this case, the goodness of the Good would lie in the fact that it makes things *other than itself* good in the normal sense (i.e., unifies their components).

[100] One might say that the most unified thing may be one that has no parts at all, e.g., an entirely solid, featureless atom. In my view, such a thing would not be unified in any relevant sense because it has no components to be unified. Note that by "unified," I refer to its *components'* being unified.

[101] In *Philebus*, 26e1-27c3, in addition to the three kinds, i.e., "unlimited," "limit," and "something generated by a mixture of those two," the "cause" of this mixture is mentioned as the fourth kind.

the *Republic*, a middle dialogue, also express the idea that for something to be good is for its components to be unified.[102] In *Gorgias*, 503d5-505d4, 506e2-4, Socrates remarks that for a thing to be good is for it (or its components) to possess a proper structure (*taxis*) or order (*kosmos*), regardless of whether it is an artifact, body, or soul. In the *Republic*, Socrates presents the idea that in the case of an individual soul as well as in the case of a city, it is virtuous for its components (i.e., rulers, fighters, and producers on the one hand, and calculative, spirited, and appetitive elements on the other) to be ordered (*kosmēsanta*, 443d5), harmonized (*hērmosmenon*, 443e2), and unified (*hena genomenon*, 443e1-2), and vicious for them to be torn apart.[103][104][105]

It is at *Republic*, 500c3-6 where the idea I attribute to Plato in (A2) that the totality of Forms is unified makes its most obvious appearance. In this passage, Forms are described as "ordered" (*tetagmena*)[106] and as "maintaining their

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[102] In saying this, I do not deny that there may be some change in Plato's philosophical thought from early to middle and then late dialogues. My claim is only that there is sufficient room to ascribe to Plato — at least since *Gorgias* — the idea that for something to be good is for its components to be unified. See also n. 170 in Chapter 5.

[103] For the city, see 423b5-d7, 433a1-434c11, 462a9-e3, 551d5-7. For the soul, see 410b10-412b2, 443c9-444e5, 554d9-e7, 586e4-587a2, 588b1-590a5.

[104] For the relation between goodness and being unified, see also Aristoxenus' testimony (*Elementa Harmonica* II, 30-31). To conclude his public lecture, Plato is said to have remarked that the Good is one (*hen*). According to Gaiser, 17-25, the day when Plato gave that lecture is placed between B.C. 355 and B.C. 348/347, i.e., sometime from the time when Plato finished writing the *Seventh Letter* (authentic, in his view) to the time of Plato's death. He decided to give the lecture presumably because (1) several people, including Dionysius II of Syracuse, published works in which they misrepresented Plato's thought on the Good, and (2) Plato tried to get rid of the hatred directed at the esoteric attitude of the Academy — hatred that some influential people in Athens had nurtured.

[105] I assume that the "unified" is a normative notion for Plato. That is, Plato would not accept that something is sufficiently unified if it is not sufficiently good. As long as, e.g., a vicious city preserves the shape of a city, it is unified to a minimum degree. However, this is just another way of saying that it is bad. See *Philebus*, 64d9-e3, where Socrates says that any blend that has no measure is no blend at all but "a kind of unblended *disaster*" (*tis akratos sympephorēmenē*).

[106] In Plato, "*taxis*" and its cognates are often used for "structure" or "order" that consists of the arrangement of various components (see *Gorgias*, 503e6, 504a1, *Timaeus*, 30a5, 88a3, *Philebus*, 30c5-6, *Laws*, 665a1-2, 668e2, 903b6). I assume that Forms are said to be "ordered" (*tetagmena*) at *Republic*, 500c3-6 because they are unified *as components* in such a way as to constitute a systematic order.

harmony and rationality in everything (*kosmō[i] ... panta kai kata logon echonta*), and neither behaving unjustly nor being treated unjustly by each other."[107]

To conclude this chapter, I will briefly summarize my discussion. With regard to the Form of the Good, I considered what is meant by the fact that Plato usually speaks of "the Good" as, on the one hand, one Form among other Forms, such as the Beautiful and the Just, and, on the other hand, at VI, 509b7-9, in the Simile of the Sun, as a special "Form" that transcends the other Forms. I argued that these two ways of speaking of the Good should not be taken to represent two different items but rather two *aspects* of the same item.

[107] Rowe's translation. The same point may be conveyed in 592b1-4, where it is said that the ideal city "is perhaps set up as a paradigm in the heavens, for anyone who wishes to see it, and found himself" (Rowe's translation). However, some interpreters suppose that an astronomical observation is at issue here. See Burnyeat (2001), 9; Notomi (2012), 227-239.

Chapter 4
The Object of Thought (*Dianoia*) in the Divided Line, 509d1-511e5

In the Divided Line, Socrates describes the practices of both geometricians and dialecticians. In this chapter, I will primarily address the notoriously controversial issue of what to make of his description of the geometricians. In particular, I will discuss what the object of thought (*dianoia*) is. (I will consider Socrates' description of the philosophical dialectic in Chapter 5.) In the course of my discussion, I will point out that, for Plato, not only dialecticians but also geometricians possess a certain sort of non-propositional cognition that is specified in terms of different kinds of objects. First, I take a closer look at the Divided Line passage.

After comparing the Good to the sun (507a7-509b9), Socrates invites Glaucon to imagine a line (AE)[108] that is divided into two unequal sections (AC and CE, presumably with the former being longer).[109] AC represents the intelligible realm and CE the visible one. These sections are each to be divided in the same proportion as AC to CE. (AC is divided into AB and BC; and CE into CD and DE.) Socrates distributes four "states of mind" (*pathēmata en tē[i] psychē[i]*) amongst these four subsections: intellect (*noēsis*) is assigned to AB;

I am most grateful to Giovanni Ferrari, who generously helped me write an early version of this chapter as my advisor during my stay as a Visiting Student Researcher at the Department of Classics of the University of California, Berkeley, from August 2015 to June 2016.

[108] *Pace* Echterling, 5-15, who suggests the following. Glaucon, going through a quite complicated process of drawing, should picture a *right triangle*, whose hypotenuse and adjacent side are two lines divided into four in the same ratio; and "*tmēmata*" (511d7), to which truth and clearness are said to correspond, is four different *areas*, which appear when the four dividing points of the hypotenuse are connected to the four dividing points of the adjacent side. I find this interpretation unconvincing, partly because Glaucon, who is not himself a geometrician, is described as following Socrates' instruction on the spot, without showing any difficulty (cf. 510a4); this indicates that his drawing is not as complicated as Echterling suggests.

[109] Cf. Smith (1996), 27-28. Denyer, 292-94, contends, though, that it does not really matter which section is meant to be longer.

thought (*dianoia*) to BC; belief[110] (*pistis*) to CD; and imagination (*eikasia*) to DE. Intellect partakes of the highest degree of clearness (*saphēneia*). It is followed in order by thought, belief, and imagination. Socrates attributes thought to mathematicians, including geometricians, and intellect to dialecticians. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, their practices are distinguished in the following two respects. First, whereas the mathematician takes hypotheses for granted and deduces conclusions from them (510b4-d3), the dialectician moves from hypotheses to the "principle" (*archē*) (511b1-c1).[111] Second, the geometrician, unlike the dialectician, makes use of visible figures as assistance for his/her inquiry (510d5-511c2).

What is subsection BC meant to represent? Most interpreters agree that each subsection stands for a certain *type of entity*, i.e., the object of its corresponding cognitive state of mind. (More than one subsection may represent the same type of objects as being dealt with in different manners.) By contrast, Fine holds that (1)[112] the four subsections represent four *modes of reasoning*.

As for the majority interpretation, it seems generally agreed that AB stands for Forms; CD for visible entities such as animals, plants, and artifacts; and DE for images of these, such as shadows and reflections in water. But what does BC stand for? I.e., what is the object of thought? Four kinds of answers have been proposed:[113]

(2) Forms (Shorey, Nettleship, Cornford, Hackforth, Murphy, Ross, Cross & Woozley, and Ota).

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[110] For convenience and for a certain interpretative reason, I choose the English "belief" for the Greek "*pistis*." Of course, this "belief" is not to be confused with "belief" as meaning "*doxa*" in general.

[111] For the method of hypothesis, cf. *Meno*, 86e1-87e4, *Phaedo*, 99d4-102a3.

[112] I will number interpretations in this way.

[113] Some interpreters give no definite answer. Annas (1981), 251-52, examines and rejects (2) and (3). She finds (3) to be in conflict with the contention at 510d, which is that mathematicians talk about "the square itself" and "the diagonal itself"; Annas takes these to refer to the Forms. (But see Section 3, below.) In (2), Annas argues, the original-image relationship of the bottom part of the line (between CD and DE) would have no real analogy in the top part (between AB and BC), which would mean a break-down of the scheme of the divided line. Annas finds this problem insoluble. Cf. also Benson, n. 3, 203; Foley, 3.

(3) Mathematical entities, which are intermediary between Forms and sensibles (Adam, Burnyeat, and Denyer).

(4) Propositions that are concerned with Forms via sensibles (Boyle and Gonzalez).

(5) Sensibles (Fogelin, Bedu-Addo, White, N. P., Smith, and Rowett).

In what follows, I will support interpretation (3). I do not mean to present a decisive argument for it or against alternative interpretations. To repeat myself, my only aim is to show how I find (3) especially plausible. In Section 1, I will briefly explain the five interpretations. In Section 2, I will state why I am reluctant to adopt (1), (2), (4), or (5). In Section 3, I will respond to certain objections to my favored interpretation. In Section 4, I will present two considerations that could support (3). And in Section 5, I will consider a related issue, on the basis of my foregoing discussion.

1. Five Kinds of Interpretations

According to interpretation (1), e.g., Fine's,[114] the four subsections represent four types of reasoning. AB and BC represent two sorts of knowledge, and CD and DE two sorts of beliefs (*doxa*). DE, i.e., imagination, is a state of mind in which one cannot systematically discriminate between images and their originals. In CD, i.e., belief, one can do so but cannot adequately explain their difference. In BC, i.e., thought, one knows certain Forms without knowing that they are Forms.[115] In AB, i.e., intellect, one not only knows Forms but also knows that they are Forms. Fine's interpretation of the Divided Line constitutes part of her broader project of showing that Plato, in the *Republic*, does not analyze knowledge or other cognitive states in terms of their objects, and that he is not committed to the view that knowledge is concerned with Forms and only with Forms.[116]

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[114] Fine, 101-6.
[115] Fine, 101-12.
[116] Fine, 85-116. See also Section 3 in Chapter 1.

The other interpretations, i.e., (2) to (5), presuppose that BC stands for a certain type of object. Interpretation (2) identifies it as *Forms*. Although intellect and thought are both concerned with Forms, they do so in different manners.[117] Mathematicians[118] study Forms indirectly, while dialecticians study them directly and purely, proceeding through Forms to Forms.[119] There are three main points that seem to support this interpretation. First, as Ross remarks,[120] Socrates gives no special explanation of the mathematical in the divided line passage. (This point is also an objection to interpretation (3), to which I will respond in Section 3.) Secondly, as Murphy points out,[121] the upper subsections (AB and BC), which stand for "*noēton eidos*" (509d4) or "*nooumenon genos*" (509d8), can naturally be taken as the subdivisions *of the Forms*. For, in the Simile of the Sun, Socrates has spoken of what is intelligible solely in terms of the Forms.[122] (This constitutes another objection to (3).) Finally, at 510d7-8, Socrates speaks of "*tou tetragōnou autou"* (the square itself) and "*diametrou autēs"* (diagonal itself) to refer to objects of geometry.[123] But in Plato's middle dialogues such locutions

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117 E.g., Cross and Woozley, 237-38.

118 Is mathematics the only context in which one can have thought? Murphy and Ross answer in the affirmative. Murphy, 168-72; Ross (1951), 63. By contrast, Nettleship, 250, maintains that the zoologist, e.g., can have thought insofar as he/she considers the essence of each animal, which is a Form. Burnyeat (1992), n. 6, 186, suggests that Callipolis, built in words as a model (*paradeigma*) of a just city, is analogous to the object of mathematical *dianoia*, in that Callipolis is a perfectly just city whereas it is a particular exemplification of the Just. See also Hackforth, 2, 7; Fine, 106; Gonzalez (1998a), n.19, 363; Ota (2013), 20.

119 Ferber (2015), 82-96, is unique in that while he, in agreement with Ross, identifies the objects of thought with the Forms, he also takes it to be the hypotheses that the geometrician deals with. According to him, these hypotheses are not so much things (Dinge) as certain sorts of facts (Sachverhalte), whether they have definitional or existential character. I would not like to take this reading, either. See my discussion as to why I hesitate to take interpretations (2) or (4) in Section 2.

120 Ross (1951), 59. But he admits that interpretation (3) is attractive.

121 Murphy, 167.

122 Murphy, n. 2, 167, also points out that the phrase "*ditta eidē*" (twofold kind) at 509d4 is reminiscent of 507a7-b10, where Socrates distinguishes *the Forms* from the sensible.

123 E.g., Cornford (1965), 62-63; Hackforth, 3; Ota (2013), 17. Also, Wedberg, n. 21, 44, holds that the square and the diagonal mentioned here are "archetypes," of which their participants are imitations. Some interpreters, while rejecting (2), consider the square and the diagonal to be Forms. Fine, n. 35, 105-6; Boyle (1973), 5; Bedu-Addo (1979),

are frequently used to refer to Forms.[124] (This is yet another objection to (3).) In this interpretation, the reason for which Socrates tells Glaucon not to embark on the further division of the intelligible realm, at VII, 534a5-8, would be that the objects of intellect are actually identical to those of thought.

According to interpretation (3), e.g., Adam's, the objects of thought are intermediaries between Forms and sensibles. When geometricians draw figures, they are not really dealing with the figures *qua* visible but the figure *qua* intelligible, represented by the former. Such figures are among the intermediaries. They are different from sensibles in that they are eternal,[125] and different from Forms in that — whereas the Form of the Triangle, for example, is unique — there are many "intermediary" triangles, such as the right triangle and the equilateral one, as Burnyeat suggests.[126] Adam says, "since *dianoia* is intermediate between *nous* and *doxa* (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate between the higher *noēta* and *doxasta.*"[127] So there are *four* kinds of objects corresponding to the *four* states of mind. This accords with the fact that Socrates, at 511e1-3, implies that the four states of mind participate in clearness (*saphēneia*), to the same degree as their objects participate in truth (*alētheia*). Ascribing the idea of the mathematicals to Plato is as old as Aristotle. He reports that Plato postulated "the intermediates" (*ta metaxy*) between Forms and sensibles (*Metaph.* A.6.987b14-8, Z.2.1028b19),[128] although he does not tell us in which period of life Plato came up with this idea.[129]

101; Smith (1996), 33.

[124] *Symposium*, 211d3, *Phaedo*, 65d4-5, e3, 74a12, c1, c4-5, d6, e7, 75b6, c11-d1, 78d1, 100b6-7, c4-5, d5, 102d6, 103b4, *Republic*, 490b2-3, 507b4, 532a7, b1, 597a2, c3, *Phaedrus*, 247d6-7, 250e2.

[125] Another difference is: such figures are perfect exemplifications of, e.g., triangle whereas visible figures can never be so.

[126] Cf. Burnyeat (2000), 34-35. See also Burnyeat (1987), 227-32.

[127] Adam, 68-69.

[128] Cf. M.13.1086a12. Ross (1924), 166, lists the passages in the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle talks about the doctrine of the intermediaries. Annas (1976), 21, suggests that the attribution of the idea of the intermediaries to Plato may derive from an attempt on Aristotle's part to make sense of everything that Plato says about the numbers.

[129] Annas (1975), 156-64, maintains that in Platonic dialogues, there is no textual

According to interpretation (4), e.g., Gonzalez', the objects of thought are *propositions* which mirror Forms in a deficient way, and which state universal (though abstract) truths mirrored by a plurality of sensible objects.[130] Since the proportion of AB to BC is equal to that of CD to DE, and since DE stands for images of what CD stands for, Gonzalez argues that BC must represent some images of what AB represents, i.e., of Forms. These images are, in turn, imaged by sensibles. To support his claim that propositions are considered to be images of Forms, he cites *Phaedo* 99d4-e6, where Socrates compares "*ta onta*" (beings) to the sun and "*logoi*" (propositions) to images of the sun reflected in water.[131]

Finally, interpretation (5) assumes that the objects of thought are sensibles, such as figures drawn by geometricians. Like Gonzalez, Smith supposes that the equality of the proportion of CD to DE, and of AB to BC, shows that BC stands for images of what AC stands for.[132] However, unlike Gonzalez, he takes these images to be sensibles such as drawn figures. For, Smith thinks, the original-image relationship that Plato generally speaks of in the middle dialogues lies between Forms and sensible participants in them. If Plato introduced some non-sensibles as images of intelligible originals, he would deviate from his normal pattern without telling us anything about this deviation.[133] (This point constitutes an objection to (2), (3), and (4), which identify the objects of thought as some kind of non-sensibles.) So, Smith thinks, if we are to exempt Plato from a failure in explanation, we should assume that he places the objects of thought in

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evidence for the kind of intermediates that Aristotle ascribes to Plato in the *Metaphysics*.

[130] Gonzalez (1998a), 219-20. Gonzalez follows Boyle in thinking that the following point constitutes a reason for rejecting interpretation (3). Gonzalez (1998a), n. 19, 363. As Boyle says, the objects of thought should be images of the objects of intellect, i.e., Forms. But it seems impossible for "intermediaries" to be images of Forms. Generally speaking, an image requires a medium for it to be in, but it is not clear what the medium would be in this case. Boyle (1973), 3-4, (1974), 7. Response to this objection to interpretation (3) could be that the geometrical space may serve as the medium for geometricals to inhabit. Both the geometrical space and the realm of Forms belong to the intelligible realm, but the former, unlike the latter, is spatially extended.

[131] Gonzalez (1998a), n. 19, 363.

[132] Smith (1996), 34-40. For the same kind of reading, see Fogelin, 375-82; White, N. P., 184-86; Bedu-Addo (1979), 93-103; Rowett, 153-55.

[133] Smith (1996), 36.

the sensible realm.

2. Why I Hesitate to Take Interpretations (1), (2), (4), or (5)

In this section, I will point out difficulties in interpretations (1), (2), (4), and (5). First, let me examine (1) (Fine's). In this interpretation, Plato would be presenting his idea in a highly misleading way. When Socrates introduces images such as shadows and reflections and then their originals (509d9-510a7), he says nothing about the modes of reasoning that would correspond to imagination and belief. Socrates only talks about different types of entities. This strongly suggests that it is in terms of the types of objects that these two states of mind are distinguished. If, as Fine holds, the distinction concerns modes of reasoning, Socrates' way of speaking would be pointless and misleading.

Let me next examine interpretation (2). Certainly, within the passage of the Divided Line (509d1-511e5), there may seem to be no evidence that the objects of thought are *not* Forms. However, let us turn our eyes to 532b6-c4, where Socrates connects the description of the cave with his foregoing discussion of mathematical sciences. He says:

> And the release from chains? The turning away from the shadows towards the images and the firelight? The upward path from the underground cave to the daylight, and the ability there to look, not in the first instance at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but *at their divine reflections in water and the shadows of the real things*, rather than the shadows of models cast by a light which is itself a shadow in comparison with the sun?[134] (Italics mine)

Socrates tells us that mathematical sciences finally enable the released prisoner, outside the cave, to look at the "shadows" (*skias*) or "reflections" (*phantasmata*) of the "real things." Since these "real things" should represent the Forms, and

[134] Griffith's translation.

since their "reflections" and "shadows" should be distinct from "the real things," mathematical sciences are supposed here *not* to be concerned with Forms themselves, but with something less real that is still located in the intelligible realm. Here Socrates seems to imply that mathematics and dialectic have different types of entities as their objects.

Let me then consider interpretation (4). It seems implausible that the objects of thought are propositions. As Gonzalez agrees, the objects of intellect are Forms, entities that the dialectician is concerned with. So the parallelism seems to require that the objects of thought are entities that the mathematician is concerned with. If the objects of thought were mathematical propositions, the objects of intellect would be dialectical propositions and not Forms. True, Gonzalez is aware that what the dialectician knows is irreducible to any set of propositions.[135] But the same can be said of what the mathematician knows.[136] Their mastery of each subject of geometry should not be reduced to knowing any set of geometrical propositions any more than the dialectician's knowledge of, say, the Beautiful should not be exhausted by any propositional knowledge about the Beautiful.

Regarding interpretation (5), my main reason for rejecting it has been pointed out by Ota.[137] Smith identifies the objects of thought as "objects with which thinkers at the level of thought are most aptly associated,"[138] in other words, objects *by means of which* mathematicians engage in their study.[139] However, it seems stretched to take the objects of thought in this way. At 511a4-8, Socrates identifies the lesser part of the intelligible realm as *what is studied.* He says:

This is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, but with the

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[135] See 3-3 in Chapter 1.
[136] For this point, see Rowett, 151-52.
[137] Ota (2013), 17.
[138] Smith (1996), 39.
[139] Similarly, Bedu-Addo (1979), 101-2, says that we must distinguish between what one, in the state of thought, thinks about — i.e., per his reading, Forms — on the one hand and, on the other hand, the objects that correspond to BC.

reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation *of it* (*peri tēn zētēsin autou*) ...[140] (Italics mine)

Here, "*autou*" refers to what BC represents, and Socrates speaks of it as the object, not a means, of investigation. This suggests that the objects of thought are not sensibles but intelligibles.[141]

3. Replies to the Objections to (3)

In Section 1, when presenting some of the interpretations, I mentioned main points that are supposed to support them. Some of these points constitute substantially reasons for not taking on (3). In this section, I will respond to three such objections to my favored interpretation.

First, we saw some interpreters object to (3), in that there is no special account of mathematicals in the text.[142] To respond to this objection, I would point out that Plato, especially in the middle dialogues, tends to avoid the full consideration of highly detailed or subtle issues, which might lead to a huge undesirable digression. In such a case, Plato is inclined to touch upon those issues only in passing, in order to focus on his main discussion. One example of this tendency is found at *Phaedo*, 100c9-d8, where Plato, before proceeding on to the final argument for the immortality of the soul, has Socrates hint that there could be a problem with regard to how to make of the relation of the Form to its participant. Nonetheless, he then immediately sets aside this issue to return to the main one.[143] Another example is at *Republic* V, 476a7: Socrates refers to the

[140] Shorey's translation.
[141] Moreover, Socrates' encapsulation of the points of the divided line at VII, 534a1-5 seems to speak against Smith's reading. After having called the higher two states of mind, respectively, "*epistēmē*" and "*dianoia*," Socrates puts them together as "*noēsis,*" and remarks that "*noēsis*" is about "*ousia"* (being). Whatever "*ousia*" in this context may mean, it certainly is not sensible. So it seems to be implied here that neither intellect nor thought is concerned with sensibles as their objects.
[142] Ross (1951), 59; Boyle (1973), 3-4; Smith (1996), 36.
[143] This issue is going to be fully discussed at *Parmenides*, 130a2-133a10.

"association" (*koinōnia*) of the Forms with one another, without explicating or developing this idea.[144] In the same vein, as Burnyeat points out,[145] when Socrates prevents Glaucon from further division of the intelligible realm, at 534a5-8, this could be taken as an example of such avoidance on the part of Plato. So, it seems possible to suppose that Plato purposely avoids offering a full account of the difference between Forms and mathematicals in the *Republic*, because he is not willing to develop the point there.

Second, we saw Murphy object to (3), stating that since, in the Simile of the Sun, Socrates speaks of what is intelligible solely in terms of the Forms, it is difficult to take "*noēton eidos*" or "*nooumenon genos*" in the divided line ― i.e., what the upper section (AC) stands for ― as containing items other than Forms. This objection presupposes that, in the Simile of the Sun, Socrates means that the intelligible realm is *exclusively* composed of Forms. However, this presupposition is not so obvious; he may simply mean that the Forms are *representative* inhabitants in this realm. This consideration could be supported by observing an analogous case as regards the visible realm: although Socrates, in the Simile of the Sun, never mentions images such as shadows and reflections in water, he suddenly tells us that they are contained in "*horaton eidos*" or "*horōmenon genos*" at the beginning of the divided line passage (509d8-510a3). In the same vein, we could naturally assume that Socrates, in the Divided Line, considers "*noēton eidos*" or "*nooumenon genos*" to include other intelligible objects, i.e., mathematicals, even if he has never mentioned them before.

The third objection to (3) is that locutions such as "*tou tetragōnou autou*" and "*diametrou autēs,*" at 510d7-8, indicate that the Forms are in question here. However, as Denyer correctly points out,[146] such locutions do not always refer to

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[144] Plato will tackle this issue at *Sophist*, 251d5-259d8. I do not mean that whenever Plato avoids discussing a cumbersome issue, he will give a fuller treatment in a later dialogue.

[145] Burnyeat (2000), 33-34.

[146] Denyer, 304. For instance, when Plato uses "the poet himself" (*autou tou poiētou*) at 394c2 or "fire itself" (*autō[i] tō[i] pyri*) at 404c4, he does not mean the Form of the Poet or Fire at all.

the Forms.[147] As he explains, the emphasis of "itself" in "the square itself" and "a diagonal itself" can be taken to indicate only that the square and the diagonal that the geometrician speaks about are free of "something that clutters their diagram," such as the breadth and imperfect straightness of the sides.[148] So 510d7-8 is compatible with the view that Socrates conceives of the geometrical figures as intermediaries.

4. **Considerations in Favor of (3)**

I will make two considerations in favor of interpretation (3).

First and most importantly, as I have said in Section 2, this reading can make good sense of the mathematicians' practice and allow Plato to describe their practice accurately.[149] For when the geometrician is concerned with, e.g., a triangle, it seems that he/she is concerned with the very triangle that is at issue in the problem he/she is dealing with. In this sense, the geometrician's triangle, unlike the dialectician's, derives its identity from the specific geometrical problem at hand. True, the geometrician can consider the general properties of the triangle. Yet he/she, at each time, deals with a certain problem about a certain general property, or the relation between certain general properties, of the triangle. This context gives the triangle in question a special identity that may not

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[147] Whatever "*gōniōn tritta eidē*," which the geometrician is said to hypothesize at 510c4-5, means — *pace* Smith (2009), 13 — it would not provide any evidence against our interpretation. Since this locution should represent what they postulate as bases of their study, rather than what they consider in their study, its referent, in itself, would have nothing to do with the issue of what the object of thought is. In my view, it is rather "*tou tetragōnou autou*" and "*diametrou autēs*" at 510d7-8 that represent the object of thought. Also, the use of the term "*eidē*" does not always mean that Platonic Forms are at issue. It can just mean "kinds" in an ordinary sense (see "*ditta eidē*" at 509d4, where Socrates merely classifies things into two *kinds*, i.e., the intelligible and the visible). *Pace* Smith, *ibid.*, I do not feel any strain in taking "*eidē*" at 510c5 in that way.

[148] Denyer, 294, 305.

[149] For other Platonic discussion of the practice of mathematicians, see also *Meno*, 82b9-87b2, *Philebus*, 56c8-57a4, *Laws* VII, 817e5-822d1.

be shared by triangles considered in other contexts.[150] (This is not to deny that there may be a unified system of geometrical problems.)

By contrast, when the dialectician studies the Triangle, I suggest that he/she focuses on the essence of the triangle *qua* triangle and thereby on the place that it occupies in the whole reality.[151] This should involve placing the geometrical as a whole in the totality of beings.[152] Similarly, I would suggest that the mathematician's numbers derive their identity from the mathematical problems with which he/she deals.[153]

Second, our reading harmonizes with Plato's general attitude toward the image in the *Republic*. As we have seen, at 532b6-c4 Socrates remarks that the study of mathematical sciences finally enables one to look at the shadows or reflections of the animals, the stars, etc. outside the cave. Here, Plato seems to expect readers to take these images as representing intelligibles other than Forms. For it seems that throughout the *Republic* he emphasizes both the distinction between images and their originals and the superiority of the latter to the former. When Socrates distributes four states of mind to four subsections of the line (511d6-e4), he treats images and their originals as different types of entities, with

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[150] However, to deny that mathematicians deal with the Forms is not to say that Plato criticizes their practice. Rather, he seems to see mathematical sciences quite positively. To the question of why the future rulers of the ideal city must gain an "overall picture" of the mathematical sciences" kinship with one another after a long term of training (537b8-c3), Burnyeat answers that Plato regards the kind of systematic thinking acquired through the study of mathematics as a constitutive part of the knowledge of the Good, and not as a mere instrument that leads to it. The significance of the systematic thinking attained through the mathematical study is illustrated by the image of dialectic as the "coping stone" (*thrinkos*) of the curriculum (534e2). Burnyeat (2000), 34, 74-80. This insightful interpretation helps us understand why Plato puts so much emphasis on mathematics as a prelude to dialectic.

[151] See also Section 1 in Chapter 5.

[152] Another difference between the geometrician's triangle and the Form of Triangle lies in the fact that the former, unlike the latter, is spatially extended. See n. 130 above.

[153] The mathematician's care to keep "one" equal in its every occurrence (526a1-5) may be taken to concern the context of dealing with specific mathematical problems. *Pace* Shorey (1903), 83-5, (1937), 164. There is a Platonic tradition according to which the "monadic" (*monadikos*), arithmetical number is an image of the "substantial" (*ousiōdēs*) number, which ontologically ranks above the former. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead*, VI 6. 9. 33-36. For the monadic number, cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* M 8.1083b16-7, 1092b20.

the former participating in a lesser degree of truth. Furthermore, in Book X, 596a5-598d7, when Plato downgrades imitative painters and poets on the grounds that they create mere images (*eidōla*),[154] he remarks that the former are at two removes from Forms, while the latter are just one remove away. Given that both this distinction and the superiority of originals to images are congenial to Plato's general view of images in the *Republic*, it is likely that he also maintains this at 532b6-c4, in a description of the Analogy of the Cave. So it seems a plausible guess that the shadows and reflections outside the cave represent intelligible entities other than Forms, most likely, mathematical entities.

5. Further Consideration

So far, I have shown how I find it plausible to assume, with Adam, Denyer, and Burnyeat, that for Plato the objects of thought are, at least for one thing, mathematical entities that are intermediary between Forms and sensibles. Given this interpretation, let me then turn to a related issue: the fact that BC and CD are made equal in length seems to imply that the two states of mind corresponding to these subsections, i.e., belief and thought, are meant to participate in the *same* degree of clearness.[155] However, this is contrary not only to our anticipation that thought should be better than belief in clearness but also to what Socrates himself implies at 533d4-6, i.e., that thought (*dianoia*) is clearer than *doxa*, which consists of belief (*pistis*) and imagination (*eikasia*). Plato, again, does not explicate this shocking implication in the Divided Line passage. Although this is a separate issue from the main one for the present chapter, I wish to address it, partly because of its own interest and partly because some of the foregoing consideration can help us here.

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[154] Furthermore, at 598b3-5 Socrates asks whether the painting imitates appearance (*phantasma*) or truth. Plato uses the same word, "*phantasma*," at 510a1-2 (in the Divided Line passage), to mention examples of the image (*eikōn*), i.e., reflections in water or smooth surfaces.

[155] Moreover, the objects of those two states of mind also would partake in the same degree of truth.

Foley believes that there is no coherent solution to this problem, and that Plato expects readers to progress sequentially through the four states of mind presented in the Divided Line. Upon first reading of the Divided Line passage, they may uncritically accept the image (imagination); then they may notice, when seeing the line drawn, that the two middle subsections may be equal (belief); next they ascertain, by mathematical proof, that these subsections are really equal (thought); and they deal with the difficulty of making sense of the implication of this equality in regard to the relation between belief and thought (intellect).[156]

I agree with Foley that there is no coherent solution to the problem of equality and that Plato sends us some messages by posing this problem. However, I am inclined to see differently Plato's reason for doing so. It seems a slight stretch to claim, as Foley does, that the four modes reading of the Divided Line passage each correspond to the four states of mind that Socrates has in mind here. In particular, I do not see how noticing, by seeing the line drawn, that the two middle subsections may be equal corresponds to belief.

Denyer enumerates three possible reasons that might explain why Plato makes the middle subsections equal in length (though Denyer avoids choosing any of these as his own answer):[157] (i) Plato is suggesting that since an image always falls short of the original of which it is an image, and since the divided line is itself an image, the divided line, too, is defective;[158] (ii) he is hinting that thought is actually no better than belief, unless it develops to the finest state of mind, i.e., intellect; and (iii) by writing the text in such a way as to allow these two incompatible interpretations, he is provoking the reader to go beyond the contradictory appearances, just as in the case of the largeness or smallness of fingers (523b9-524d7).[159]

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[156] Foley, 19-23.
[157] Denyer, 296.
[158] For the same line of suggestion, see also Smith (1996), 43.
[159] Bedu-Addo (1979), 103-8, explains the equality by saying that both BC and CD represent the same objects, i.e., sensibles. Yet mathematicians, when dealing with the sensible figures that they draw, take them as images of Forms, while ordinary people are unaware that sensibles can be images of Forms, since they are unaware of Forms. That

Of these three, I consider (i) to be the most plausible. For one thing, this interpretation seems to harmonize with Plato's overall view that we have seen, which is that images are bound to suffer from imperfection. And that intentional (as I believe) "defect" in Plato's presentation of the divided line would be understood as his implicit warning not to rely totally on images, not even ones of his own.[160] Secondly, both (ii) and (iii) entail that thought is actually no better than belief, but it is difficult to believe that Plato really thinks so. It would be odd if the state of mind acquired by a long term of mathematical training should be merely as clear as that of ordinary people.

Let me summarize my discussion in this chapter. Each of the four subsections of the divided line represents a certain type of *entity*. What is represented by the second subsection, which corresponds to thought (*dianoia*)? I have contended that it stands for mathematical entities that are intermediary between Forms and sensibles. I favor this interpretation partly because it can make good sense of the geometrician's practice: when dealing with a triangle, he/she should deal with the intelligible triangle which is different from the Form of Triangle. I have suggested that the geometrician's triangles derive their identity from the *geometrical problems* with which he/she deals. I concluded by addressing the question of what to make of the equality in length of the two middle subsections of the line. Actually, the two subsections should not have

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both BC and CD stand for sensibles is, Bedu-Addo says, confirmed by the fact that what BC represents (i.e., reflections and shadows outside the cave), and what CD does (i.e., statuettes and puppets in the cave), are ontologically the same type of object, in that both are direct images of the real things outside the cave. (But note that the reflections and shadows outside the cave are, unlike the shadows and puppets in the cave, called "divine" (*theia*) at 532c2 if we follow MSS. For justification of this emendation, see esp. Adam, 189-90.) Smith (1996), 40-42, while agreeing with Bedu-Addo in taking the objects of thought to be sensibles, considers him to fail to explain why thought and belief are supposed to participate in the same degree of clearness.

[160] Cf. 506d7-e3, where Socrates confesses that he is unable to state what the Good is itself, and proposes to present an image or simile of it instead. For Socrates' cognitive condition in this dependence on images, see Gonzalez (1996), n. 50, 273; Ferber (2013), 236-37. See also *Timaeus*, 27d5-29d3, where Timaeus says that he cannot offer an exact but only a likely account (*eikōs logos*) of the generation of the universe.

been equal. By planting this inadequacy, Plato is warning the reader of the limits of a simile.

Chapter 5
"The Unhypothesized Principle" in the Divided Line, 509c1-511e5, 533c8-535a2

In Chapter 3, I referred to "the totality of Forms" when sketching my interpretation of the metaphysics and epistemology in *Republic*, VI-VII. In so doing, I was alluding to "the unhypothesized principle," which Socrates refers to in the Divided Line. Thus, I understand "the unhypothesized principle" as meaning the totality of Forms ― the principle which is to be reached at the end of "the upward path" (510b6-8, 511b4-6) of dialectic, where the dialectician discards one hypothesis after another. This is to say that I do not identify "the unhypothesized principle" to be the Form of the Good.[161] In the following sections in this chapter, I will explain and support this point.

1. "The Unhypothesized Principle" as the Totality of Forms

First, let us review the description of dialectic in the Divided Line passages (509c-511e, 533c-535a). In mathematical sciences, having posited odd and even, kinds of figures, three kinds of angles, and so on as "hyphothesis" (*hypothesis*), one considers what derives from it, but does not explain or give an account of the hypothesis itself. By contrast, those who engage in dialectic proceed while doing away with (*anairousa*, 533c9) the "hyphothesis" provided as a basis for inquiry. This is the "upward path" of dialectic, at the end of which one is supposed to

[161] For the minority of interpreters who do not identify those two items, see Seel, 178-84; Bedu-Addo (1987), 124-25; Sayre, 173-81; Balzly, 156-57; Delcomminette, 40-41. I do not identify the Form of the Good with "the unhypothesized principle" for the following reasons. If they are identical, what renders a good man or good desk good is what is to be grasped at the end of the upward path of the dialectic, whatever this may be. However, such an idea is itself hard to understand. Moreover, because we cannot find even a slightest hint for that idea in dialogues supposedly written before the *Republic*, we have to believe that Plato's explanation of the Good has suddenly and substantially changed in the *Republic*. See Rowe (2007), 151-52.

reach "the unhypothesized principle." The next step is to move on to the "downward path" to arrive at the "conclusion" (*teleutē*).

I now construe the above description. First, what is the hypothesis at issue? According to an interpretation,[162] it is a basic *proposition* such as "every number is either odd or even" in the case of arithmetic. However, I understand the hypothesis as a *concept* that is postulated as the basis for inquiry.[163] For instance, in arithmetic, the concept of "number" is postulated as that which determines the realm of arithmetic; as are basic concepts of, for example, two kinds of numbers, "odd and even" (510c3-4). It is by using these concepts that the study of arithmetic is performed. Similarly, in geometry, the concept that determines its realm, "figure," is postulated, as are other basic concepts: for example, "plane and solid figures" as two types of basic figures, the related concept of "angle" and its three types, "acute, right, and obtuse" (510c4-5). All are employed in the study of geometry.

In arithmetic, however, one does not place the concept of "number" (or basic concepts such as kinds of numbers) into a broader context of entities beyond the framework of arithmetic. Nor in geometry does one place the concept of "figure" (or basic concepts such as "plane and solid figures") into a broader context of entities beyond the framework of geometry. I understand this to be what is meant when Socrates says that in mathematical studies, one does not explain or give an account of the hypothesis itself.

In dialectic, by contrast, one asks what each thing is and gives an answer to this question. To give a definition of a thing involves subsuming it under a more general entity, as a "species" of a "genus." This involves subsuming a certain Form (in this context, almost an equivalent of the concept) under a more general "genus." This more general genus or Form is then subsumed under an even more general Form, and so on ― leading one to go "upward."[164] In this way, I take

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[162] See Cross and Woozley, 247. See also Ferber (2015), 85-87.

[163] See Rowett, 156-59.

[164] For this line of interpretation, which considers the "upward path" in the Divided Line to broadly correspond to the procedure of collection in *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* (and the "downward path" to the procedure of division), see Seel, 177-78. For an objection to this reading, see Mason,

"doing away with hypotheses" as meaning to place a given Form into a broader context of Forms one after another, rather than remaining in a certain realm provided by the Form one has immediately in mind.[165] However, there may be more than one way to subsume a given Form under a more general Form. Depending on the viewpoint adopted, a Form may be subsumed under several different Forms.

Of course, it is not that one literally abandons (i.e., stops considering) the Form as such when "doing away with the hypothesis." Rather, what is "done away with" seems to be the *hypothetical character* a Form has possessed so far: the *unclearness* that previously resided in the soul considering the Form.[166] I therefore take doing away with the hypothesis as clarifying one's understanding of the Form at issue. Thus, the broader the context of Forms into which a certain Form is placed, the clearer one's understanding of the Form becomes. Such an "ascent" continues until one reaches "the unhypothesized principle," i.e., the totality of Forms. Part of the reason why it is called a "principle" (*archē*) seems

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[165] Not only in the study of dialectic but also in the transitional stage from studying each of the mathematical sciences to the dialectic, to place the present object of study in a broader context is regarded as crucial for the progress of study. In 531c9-d3, 537b7-c3, it is said that those who have finished learning each of the mathematical sciences must then grasp their "community" (*koinōnian*) and "kinship" (*syggeneian*) with one another and acquire the "overall picture" (*synopsin*); whether or not one has this view is the "largest test" (*megistē peira*) of a dialectical nature as "the one who has the overall picture" (*synoptikos*) is the "dialectician" (*dialektikos*) (537c6-7). For an illuminating attempt to understand what is meant by those difficult expressions, see Burnyeat (2000), 67-80; for a critical comment on his interpretation, see Gill (2007), 259-72; White, M. J., 233, 241.

[166] Delcomminette, 40, also understands "doing away with the hypothesis" as meaning to get rid of the hypothetical character, i.e., unclearness. In the same way, Robinson, 172-73, takes the hypothetical character to be abandoned as uncertainty. (These two interpretations differ from mine in that they both regard the hypothesis as a certain proposition.) To the line of reading that takes doing away with the hypothesis to involve removing its unclearness or uncertainty, Gonzalez (1998a), 238, makes the following objection: given that the hypothesis would be clear and certain to the highest degree to geometricians (510c2-d30), then, according to that interpretation, they would have done away with the hypothesis from the outset, which is absurd. But *pace* Gonzalez, if a proposition or a concept *appears* clear to geometricians, this does not mean that it *is* really clear to them.

to be that it is, as we shortly see, the starting point for consideration at the stage of the "downward path."[167]

I understand the "downward path" of dialectic as consisting of the following process: first, one divides the totality of Forms into parts, then divides each of those parts into smaller parts, and then further divides each of those smaller parts into even smaller parts, and so on. (The "descent" heads for the special from the universal, whereas the "ascent" heads for the universal from the special.[168]) In so doing, one acquires a unified and articulated synoptic view over all the Forms that have been separated in the process of division. In effect, perfect knowledge is acquired of the system containing all those Forms. In this interpretation, the "conclusion" of the "downward path" is akin to the lowest species of the genus-species system.[169] (However, there may be more than one way to divide a certain Form into several lower Forms.)[170]

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[167] At 511b6, the principle is mentioned as "*tēn tou pantos archēn*" (the principle of everything). What does "*pantos*" refer to here? One might suppose that it means literally everything, i.e., all the Forms as well as all of their participants. In which case, "*tēn tou pantos archēn*" would arguably be the Form of the Good, the ultimate cause of the totality of Forms, which, in turn, are causes of their participants. However, I assume that in this instance "*pantos*" is used rather hyperbolically as meaning "everything *that consists of the process of the downward path*." (For hyperbolical uses of "*pas*," see 475a1, 488c2, 504d8-9. See also "*panta prattei*" at 505e1-2, a passage I scrutinized in Chapter 2.) Based on this understanding, Socrates can be taken as referring to the system of all Forms as "*archē*," the taking hold of which, in my view, constitutes the starting point of the downward path.

[168] "What follows from the principle" (*tōn ekeinēs echomenōn*, 511b6-7), which the dialectician is said to keep hold of, are several parts derived from division of the system of all Forms. These are said to "follow from" the system (or the principle) because, however small they may be, they are parts *of* the system and hence their identities are each determined (directly or indirectly) in relation to the whole system.

[169] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 277b7-8. One might ask at which point of the dialectical process described above, based on my discussion of "knowledge" in Chapter 1, "acquaintance" with a given Form is supposed to come about. For now, I would like to leave this question open. For one thing, it might depend on what type of Form the dialectician deals with.

[170] Albeit in examples from a late dialogue in *Sophist*, 265e3-266a11, the productive art is divided from one viewpoint into human and divine arts, and from another into original-making and copy-making. Moreover, although both inquire into what the sophist is and what the politician is, the Eleatic Stranger starts with division of knowledge: the way the division of knowledge takes place to discover who the politician is, as noted in *Politicus*, 258b7-c1, differs from that taking place to discover

Why then does "the unhypothesized principle," which I believe is the system of all Forms, make its appearance in the series of discussions on the Good? My answer is as follows. Among the many things that are unified and made good by the Form of the Good, the system of all Forms is an exceedingly good thing that has the highest degree of unity. Plato, therefore, believed it to be especially beneficial to learn how that system is unified for the study of the Form of the Good, which is the cause of unification.[171] This is why "the unhypothesized principle" is mentioned in contexts where the study of the Good is at issue.

I do not claim that the above interpretation is the only way to understand the Divided Line. However, I do claim that it is consistent with the text.

2. Taking a Place in a System: Intelligibility and Being

Following the interpretation of the epistemology presented in the Divided Line, in this section I will move on to the remaining task, fleshing out my claim that (B) for Plato, the Form of the Good, by making the totality of Forms good (i.e., by unifying it, as shown in Section 2 in Chapter 3), also provides each Form with its being and intelligibility.[172]

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who the sophist is (see *Politicus*, 265b8-d2, 266e4-11). In this way, I refer to late dialogues in order to understand the epistemology in the *Republic*. But I do not mean to deny that there are some important differences between the middle and late epistemologies.

[171] The idea that one should look at the exemplarily good thing to grasp the Good itself is found in *Philebus*, 63e7-64a3, although what is called "the most beautiful and stable mixture (*meixis*) or blend (*krasis*)" in which to learn the Good is the good *life*. A similar idea can be found in *Symposium*, 210a4-e5, where a lover is described as first looking at a beautiful body, and then at all beautiful bodies; after he has seen beautiful souls, activities, and knowledge, he is said to be turned to "the ocean of beauty" (*to poly pelagos … tou kalou*, d4). In accordance with Ferrari (1992), 258-59, I would like to take "the ocean of beauty" as comprising all beautiful things the lover has seen so far. In so doing, we can assume that "the ocean of beauty" is the most beautiful thing (apart from the beautiful itself to be seen henceforth) and that contemplation of it is conceived of as preparation to see the Form of the Beautiful.

[172] This claim is compatible with the interpretation of Santas (1984), 241-52, (2002),

I explain this claim as follows. (B1) For Plato, in general, each component of a system acquires its intelligibility and being by taking a certain place in the system. (B2) For Plato, each Form therefore acquires its intelligibility and being by taking a certain place in the system of all Forms. (B3) The Form of the Good, by unifying the totality of Forms, provides each Form with that place in the whole system.

The part that requires further explanation is (B1). If the general claim of (B1) is accepted, (B2), its application to the particular case of Forms, will be naturally accepted. Furthermore, (B3) is to be accepted from the two points already made; from the point in Section 3 in Chapter 3 that the Form of the Good unifies the totality of Forms, and the point in Section 1 in this chapter that the totality of Forms constitutes a system while each of the Forms takes a certain place in this system.

It is in *Philebus*, 18b6-d2 where the idea I ascribe to Plato in (B1) appears in the most obvious manner. Here, Socrates speaks of how "some god or godlike man ― according to the tradition in Egypt, a certain deity called Theuth" discovered, by classifying vocal sounds into several different kinds, the system of speech sounds or the alphabet. According to Socrates, the discoverer named "element" (*stoicheion*) not only each of letters such as "A," "E," "S," and "T" but also the entirety of all letters. Socrates continues:

> Perceiving, however, that none of us could learn any one of them alone by itself without learning them all,[173] and considering that this was a common

370-75, according to whom, the properties of Forms are classified into two types: (1) the properties each Form has as a Form (e.g., eternity and intelligibility), and (2) the properties each Form has as a specific Form (e.g., beauty in the case of the Form of the Beautiful); and the Form of the Good provides each Form with (1), i.e., the properties each Form has as a Form. It is possible to assume, as I claim, that the Good, by unifying the Forms, provides each Form with the properties each has as a Form, as Santas contends. For a general objection to Santas, see Singpurwalla, 324-29. Although Santas understands Plato as presenting two compatible theories of the Good in the *Republic* (i.e., the account of the Good presented in Book I, which appeals to the function of each thing, and the account in Books VI-VII, which is based on the theory of Forms), she argues that they are, in fact, incompatible.

[173] In *Theaetetus*, 206a1-b12, it is argued that knowledge of each letter is prior to that

bond which made them in a way all one, he assigned to them all a single science and called it grammar (*grammatikē*).[174] (18c7-d2)

Socrates thus presents the idea that letters or speech sounds constitute a single system, and that it is by taking a certain place in this system that each letter or speech sound gains its identity and becomes learnable.[175] I believe it is plausible to regard the view presented here, that it is decisive for the acquisition of knowledge[176] to know the relevant *whole*,[177] [178] as one of the general,

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of syllables which consist of letters. Following Harte (2002), 146-48, however, I would like to take Plato as problematizing a view that he does not actually endorse. *Pace* Burnyeat (1990), 209-12.

[174] Fowler's translation. In *Sophist*, 252e9-253e6, the expertise of grammar is introduced to illustrate the philosophical dialectic: i.e., just as an expert in grammar knows which kinds of letters can be associated with which, so an expert in dialectic knows which kinds can "mix" with which. See also *Politicus*, 285c4-d4.

[175] In 17c9-e3, it is said that in order to acquire knowledge of music, one must grasp not only the number and quality of the intervals but also the limits of the intervals and all the *systems* (*systēmata*) derived from them.

[176] There is controversy as to whether Plato's epistemology belongs to "foundationalism" or "coherentism." See Fine, 108-16; Nally, 160-66. The expert in dialectic is supposed to have a system of knowledge that consists of sets of propositions, and to know each of these propositions. But to know a proposition, one has to be able to explain why it is true; however, to explain this, one has to know the proposition(s) that is the content of the explanation; so one also has to be able to explain that proposition, — and so on. How can we put an end to this seemingly infinite regress? "Foundationalism" holds that the system of sets of propositional knowledge is founded by something which, being evident by itself, needs no further explanation. (For interpreters who attribute a certain type of foundationalism to Plato, see Robinson, 172-77; Cross and Woozley, 252-53; Sorabji, 299-301; Nally, 160-66.) By contrast, "coherentism" holds that there is no such self-evident foundation, and that the sets of propositions comprising the system are justified by the coherency of the system as a whole. (For those who attribute a certain type of coherentism, see Fine, 115-16; Irwin (1995), 223; Gosling (1973), 67-68; Annas (1981), 200, 243; Gentzler, 486-87.) In my view, Plato's epistemology possesses both foundationalist and coherentist aspects. If Plato was asked what item is to provide the basis of such a system of propositions, I speculate he would answer that it is the system of all Forms (i.e., "the unhypothesized principle"). In this sense, Plato's epistemology as I understand it would be foundationalist. At the same time, I speculate that if Plato ever considered what justified each of the propositions in the system, he would regard it as the coherency or interrelationship of the whole system. In this sense, his epistemology would be coherentist.

[177] Harte (2002) makes this point in terms of the priority of a whole to its parts by

fundamental features of Plato's philosophy.

Finally, I will summarize the discussion in this chapter, in which I presented my interpretation of "the unhypothesized principle." For Plato, for something to be good is for its components to be *unified*. "The unhypothesized principle" is the system of all Forms, which is unified as an especially good thing among good things in general. In the upward path, the dialectician subsumes a given Form under a more general Form and then subsumes this under an even more general Form. Thus, the whole system of Forms is both the endpoint of this procedure and the starting point for the downward path. This system is an especially good thing, exhibiting the highest unity; grasping this system thus promotes one's understanding of the Good.

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carefully considering late dialogues such as *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Timaeus*, and *Philebus*, although she leaves it open as to whether this also applies to the Forms discussed in the middle dialogues. Such a holistic view of knowledge was already suggested in *Meno*, 81c9-d4, where Socrates says that it is possible, after recalling one thing only, to discover everything else because all nature is akin.

[178] For the representative interpretation that attributes to Plato in the *Republic* the holistic view of knowledge, see Fine, 98-99. Assuming that the Form of the Good and "the unhypothesized principle" are identical, she takes it to be the structure of all Forms. In the same way that bricks and mortar of a house function as elements that realize the structure of the house, Forms function as elements that realize the structure of Forms. To know this structure, Fine contends, involves knowing what role each Form plays in this structure. Conversely, to know each Form sufficiently, one needs to know what place it takes in the whole structure. Fine, however, takes the knowledge (*epistēmē*) that Plato has in mind to be *nothing but* knowing (a set of) propositions. See Fine, 113-15. In Chapter 1, I discussed problems of identifying *epistēmē* for Plato as knowing a set of propositions.

Conclusion

So far in this thesis, I have presented my interpretation of Plato's epistemology in the *Republic*. In so doing, I have contended that, for Plato, knowledge of F cannot be reduced to any set of propositions about F.

This implies that knowledge of F cannot be identical to knowing even a definition of F, if there is any such thing. Here arises a question. Why does Plato, especially in early dialogues such as *Euthyphro* and *Laches*, repeatedly describe Socrates' inquiry into virtues (and values such as the beauty), where he demands that his interlocutors *define* each of the virtues? Rowett recently suggested that by depicting Socrates' inquiry into virtues and his failure to define them, Plato in fact hints at the futility of attempts to define virtues.[179] Thus, unlike the character Socrates depicted in early dialogues, the author Plato finds it *impossible* to define virtues.

I am inclined to resist this interpretation. Although I am unable to consider this issue in depth, I will briefly explain why I take this position. At 534b3-6, Socrates describes the dialectician in the following manner:

> And will you also give the name "dialectician" to someone who gets hold of an account of what each thing is? Correspondingly, will you assert that just insofar as someone isn't able to give such an account of it either to himself or to anyone else, to that extent he lacks intelligent understanding (*noun*) of it?[180]

Rowett may well deny that Socrates in this instance is committed to the idea that to acquire knowledge of F, one must identify some sort of definition of F. However, "an account of what each thing is" (*ton logon hekastou ... tēs ousias*) and the subsequent description "be able to distinguish the Form of the Good,

[179] Rowett, 26-27.
[180] Rowe's translation.

isolating it from all the other things" (*echē[i] diorisasthai tō[i] logō[i] apo tōn allōn pantōn aphelōn tēn tou agathou idean*, 534b8-c1) strongly suggest that the dialectical practice at issue involves dialectician's giving a definition of each Form.

To rebut Rowett's interpretation in an appropriate manner, it is important to address the following question. In the *Republic*, is it the case that the criterion for judging whether or not an account of F counts as a satisfactory definition of F as strict as is it is in early Socratic dialogues? For now, I would like to answer this question negatively.

In early Socratic dialogues, it seems that a sufficient definition of F is regarded as one that meets both of the following two conditions: (1) it must cover all cases of F (and exclude all cases of non-F);[181] (2) it must be specific enough not to involve an account of any other virtue.[182] However, I speculate that it is impossible to give a definitional account in such a way as to meet both conditions (1) and (2).

In any case, a full consideration of this issue must be left for my future research.

[181] Cf. *Euthyphro*, 6d9-11, 8a4-9, *Laches*, 191c7-e2, 192c3-d9, 192e1-193d10, *Charmides*, 159b7-160d4, 160e6-161b2, *Hippias Major*, 289a8-289d5, 290a3-291b6, 292d6-293c5.
[182] Cf. *Laches*, 197e10-199e12.

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